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MISMATCH: THE MISUSE OF MARKET EFFICIENCY IN
MARKET MANIPULATION CLASS ACTIONS

CHARLES R. KORSMo*
ABSTRACT

Plaintiffs commonly bring two distinct types of claims under
section JO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: (1) claims of
material misrepresentations or omissions, and (2) claims of tradebased market manipulation. Despite the distinctive features of the
two types of claims, courts have tended to treat them identically when
applying the ''fraud on the market" doctrine. In particular, courts
have required both types ofplaintiffs to make identical showings that
the relevant security was traded in an "efficient market" in order to
gain a presumption of reliance. The reasons for requiring such a
showing by plaintiffs in a misrepresentation case are, however, inapplicable in market manipulation cases. Plaintiffs alleging market
manipulation should not be required to demonstrate an efficient
market in order to benefit from the fraud on the market doctrine's
presumption of reliance. If plaintiffs are made to make any showing
at all, it should be a showing of loss causation.

* Visiting Assistant Professor, Brooklyn Law School. I am grateful to Edward Cheng,
Robin Effron, James Fanto, Henry Hansmann, Roberta Karmel, Minor Myers, James Park,
Roberta Romano, and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., for their helpful comments, and to Dean Joan
Wexler for research support. All errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION

On May 20, 2009, the SEC filed a civil complaint against eight
participants in an alleged scheme to manipulate the prices of at
least four "penny stocks" 1-a scheme which allegedly netted the
participants illicit profits of at least $6.2 million. 2 The allegations
regarding one of the four companies, Asia Global Holdings Corporation, are representative. Asia Global shares trade over-the-counter, 3
and traded for around $0.11 per share in August of 2006, just prior
to the manipulation. 4 Average trading volume was extremely light,
with only a few hundred thousand shares-less than $100,000
worth-changing hands in a typical trading week. 5 On August 9,
2009, the manipulators sprang into action and began to engage in
massive "wash sales, matched orders, and other manipulative
trading, to give the market the false impression that there was real
demand for these securities."6 Trading volume jumped to more than
ten million shares per week, and the share price jumped to an
intraday high of $0.41 on August 25. 7 Between August 30 and
September 5, a week during which trading volume peaked at more
than forty million shares, 8 the manipulators dumped nearly eight
million shares into the wave of demand, netting approximately $1.3
million. 9 By December of 2006, Asia Global stock was selling below
1. A penny stock is one with a price under $5 per share, usually trading in an over-thecounter market. For a full definition, see SEC Rule 3a51-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a51-1 (2010).
2. See Complaint at 1, SEC v. Dynkowski, No. 1-09-CV-00361-GMS, 2009 WL 2491686
(D. Del. May 20, 2009). Although the allegations are still mere allegations at this point, they
will be treated here as if they are true, in order to avoid an unsightly "allegedly'' in every
sentence.
3. Jd. at 6.
4. See Google Finance, Asia Global Holdings Corp. Historical Prices,
http://www .google.com/finance/historical?q=OTC:AAGH (update date range to include August
of 2006) (last visited Jan. 27, 2011).
5. See id.
6. Complaint, supra note 2, at 2, 12. 'Wash sales" are securities transactions in which
there is no change in actual, beneficial ownership, whereas "matched orders" are offsetting
purchases and sales entered into by a single party or by members of a pool. See infra notes
31-32 and accompanying text.
7. Complaint, supra note 2, at 12; Google Finance, supra note 4.
8. Google Finance, supra note 4.
9. Complaint, supra note 2, at 12.
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$0.05 per share, and it now trades at around $0.003 per share, with
an average weekly volume of only a few hundred thousand shares. 10
That these manipulations took place in small, thinly traded stocksfar from the glare of Wall Street analysts and the financial press-is
wholly predictable. To see why, one need only ask what conditions
must be met for such a "trade-based" market manipulation to
succeed. First and foremost, a would-be manipulator seeks to create
a fraudulent price/volume "signal," giving other traders a misleading impression of increased demand for the stock and falsely
suggesting that someone has uncovered important new information
about the company.
To do so, a manipulator seeks to create a noticeable "spike" in a
stock's price-a spike that other traders, perhaps na1ve day traders
searching for stocks with "momentum," will notice and then amplify
through their own trading, allowing the manipulator to sell into the
resulting wave at a profit. How can such a price spike be created?
One potential way would be to buy enough shares all at once to
overwhelm the readily available supply of sellers, forcing the price
up through liquidity effects. 11 Even if this fails to create a price
spike, it may still create a noticeable surge in the stock's trading
volume-a surge that could convince other traders that someone has
uncovered valuable new information, and lead them to adjust their
estimate of the stock's value upward.
Such a strategy is highly unlikely to be successful with a bluechip stock like Microsoft. Would a manipulator be able to create a
price spike by overwhelming the readily available supply of
Microsoft shares? More than fifty million shares of Microsoft stock
change hands on an average day-well over $1 billion worth. 12 How
many hundreds of millions, or billions, of dollars would need to be
put at risk for manipulative buying to stand out in this torrent of
trading? Even if the manipulator is able to stand out, how likely is
it that the sophisticated arbitrageurs following Microsoft will be
fooled into thinking the "signal" is the result of new material infor10. Google Finance, supra note 4.
11. This possibility is discussed in more detail with other potential mechanisms of
manipulation. See infra Part II.C.l.
12. See Yahoo! Finance, Microsoft Corp., http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=msft (last visited
Jan. 27, 2011).
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mation about a company covered relentlessly by the press and
hundreds of professional security analysts?
The natural targets for trade-based manipulations are not bluechip stocks like Microsoft-the chances of success are too remote,
the financial risk too ruinous. The natural targets are cow-chip
stocks like Asia GlobaJ.l 3 A relatively modest buying spree could
easily cause a noticeable spike in price and trading volume, which
in turn could attract momentum traders and stimulate a wave of
buying. Furthermore, it will seem far more plausible to the penny
stock traders that the manipulative trading activity signals the
presence of new material information about a less closely followed
company.
Thus, that the manipulations alleged by the SEC in its May 20,
2009, complaint took place in penny stocks is entirely unsurprising.
What may seem surprising, however, is that no follow-up class
actions have been filed by injured shareholders. It may be that the
amounts at stake are too small to attract litigation. But it may also be for another reason--one having little to do with economics and
everything to do with the legal rules governing class actions alleging
market manipulations. Due to a doctrinal flaw, shareholders of Asia
Global would almost certainly be unable to achieve class certification, no matter how compelling their allegations of manipulation.
Conversely-and perversely-shareholders of Microsoft would face
few difficulties in certifying a similar class, and thus obtaining
leverage for a settlement, no matter how implausible their allegations of manipulation. The sources of this curious result-and a suggestion for remedying it-are the subject of this Article.
The problem finds its root in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the landmark
case in which the Supreme Court adopted the "fraud on the market"
(FOTM) doctrine, 14 allowing plaintiffs in Rule lOb-5 15 securities
fraud claims a presumption of reliance in class action cases
involving transactions in open and developed securities markets. 16
13. One survey of SEC enforcement actions from 1990 to 2001 found that "most
manipulation cases happen in relatively inefficient markets, such as the OTC Bulletin Board
and the Pink Sheets, that are small and illiquid." Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Guojun Wu, Stocll
Market Manipulations, 79 J. Bus. 1915, 1917 (2006).
14. 485 u.s. 224 (1988).
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
16. As will be discussed in Part I.B, the basic intuition of the FOTM doctrine is that the
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Prior to the acceptance of the FOTM doctrine, the need to show
individual reliance served as a virtually insurmountable barrier to
class certification in 10b-5 cases. 17 In order to gain this presumption
of reliance, however, the Court required plaintiffs to demonstrate
that the relevant security traded in an "efficient market." 18 Though
sometimes criticized and often inconsistently applied by lower
courts, requiring plaintiffs to show market efficiency has, since
Basic, served as one of the primary gatekeeping requirements for
class certification-a role that takes on added significance in a
world where securities lawsuits are virtually always settled once a
class has been certified. 19 In arguing the logic and necessity of the
requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate an "efficient market,"
however, courts and commentators have focused on the kind of
claims at issue in Basic-allegations of material misrepresentations
or omissions affecting the market price of a security ("misrepresentation claims"). At the same time, they have largely ignored the
other common type of claim under section lO(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934-allegations of the kind of trade-based
manipulative schemes discussed above ("manipulation claims" or
"market manipulation claims"). 20 Allegations of market manipulation have been lumped together with more straightforward allega-

"market" itself can fall victim to a misrepresentation, affecting the market price of a security.
The individual investor may never hear of the misrepresentation but still be injured by
trading in reliance on the integrity of the market price. Thus, the fraud itself is "on the
market," and actual investors are injured by trading in reliance on the defrauded market.
17. See, e.g., Cannon v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 55 F.R.D. 306, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Reynolds v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 566, 567-69 (D. Utah 1970), aff'd sub nom.
Mitchell v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (lOth Cir. 1971). The difficulty existed for two
distinct reasons. First, as a matter of fact, most ordinary investors may not have read the
relevant documents, or otherwise have seen or heard the alleged misrepresentations. Second,
the need to show which of the plaintiffs did, in fact, hear about and rely on the alleged
misrepresentations would cause individual issues to predominate, making class certification
inappropriate. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); Basic, 485 U.S. at 242 (recognizing that individualized
proof of reliance effectively makes it impossible to proceed as a class because "individual
issues then would ... overwhelm[] the common ones").
18. Basic, 485 U.S. at 247.
19. See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 97, 99 (2009) ("With vanishingly rare exception, class certification sets the litigation
on a path toward resolution by way of settlement, not full-fledged testing of the plaintiffs' case
by trial.").
20. See infra Part II (discussing market manipulation).
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tions of misrepresentations and treated, without analysis, as if they
were interchangeable for the purposes of FOTM analysis.
In particular, plaintiffs alleging market manipulation have been
required to make the same showing of market efficiency as plaintiffs
alleging misrepresentations in order to invoke the FOTM doctrine
and gain the benefit of a presumption of reliance. In misrepresentation cases, market efficiency serves a clear purpose: forging a causal
chain between the defendant's misrepresentation and the plaintiffs
loss. In an efficient market, it is reasonable for the plaintiff to rely
on the market price, and any material misrepresentation will be
quickly and accurately reflected in that price. 21 Thus, the plaintiff
can be said to have indirectly relied on the misrepresentation. 22 This
analysis, however, is turned on its head in cases involved tradebased manipulative schemes. Such schemes are more likely to have
a significant effect on prices in inefficient markets and are unlikely
to succeed in efficient markets. 23 In such cases, market efficiency is
likely to sever any causal connection. Nonetheless, both types of
claims have been treated identically for FOTM purposes. 24
Although this failure to distinguish between the two kinds of
lO(b) claims has long created the potential for perverse results, it
has finally bloomed into the kind of doctrinal confusion on display
in In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation 25 and-most
21. Basic, 485 U.S. at 247.
22. Id.
23. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
24. "Although generally discussed in terms of misrepresentations, the reasoning [of
FOTM] applies equally to instances of alleged market manipulation or other schemes to
defraud. To obtain the benefit of this presumption, plaintiffs first must allege that the
relevant market was open and developed or, in other words, efficient." In re Parmalat Sec.
Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citation omitted); see also In re Citigroup
Auction Rate Sec. Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d 294, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re HiEnergy Techs., Inc.
Sec. Litig., No. SACV04-122600C, 2005 WL 3071250, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2005); 4 ALAN
R. BROMBERG & LEWJS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD &
COMMODITIES FRAUD§ 7:469 (2d ed. 2010) (noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Basic
made no distinction between the clauses of Rule 10b-5).
25. The nearly decade-long saga of In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation
generated four published opinions of interest. The first, In re Initial Pubic Offering Securities
Litigation (IPO 1), 241 F. Supp. 2d 281,297-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), denied the defendants' motion
to dismiss the original complaint. The second, In re Initial Public Offering Securities
Litigation (IPO II), 227 F.R.D. 65, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), granted the plaintiffs class
certification in six focus cases. The third, In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation
(IPO III), 471 F.3d 24, 45 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated the class certification. The fourth, In re
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recently and most pointedly-in the recent Ninth Circuit opinion
Desai v. Deutsche Bank Securities Ltd. 26 In both cases, complaints
of market manipulation foundered at the class certification stage for
inability to establish market efficiency.
This Article endeavors to provide what the existing case law and
academic literature sorely lacks-a principled examination of how
the FOTM doctrine should be applied in the context of market
manipulation claims. Part I gives a brief introduction to lOb-5
litigation and how it differs from common law fraud actions, and
provides an overview of the FOTM doctrine, showing that the Basic
Court adopted a form of the doctrine giving plaintiffs a double
presumption--of reliance and loss causation--once they establish an
efficient market.
Part II analyzes the concept of market manipulation. It discusses
the various types of potential manipulative schemes and the
contexts in which they are most likely to succeed, and concludes-as
is suggested above-that manipulative schemes are most likely to
have an effect on share prices in undeveloped, inefficient markets.
Parts III through V form the analytical core of the Article. Part
III asks whether the reasons for requiring a showing of market
efficiency are applicable in market manipulation cases, and finds
that they are not. Indeed, because manipulations are most likely to
succeed in inefficient markets, a requirement of market efficiency
has the perverse effect of screening out the most plausible claims of
market manipulation while allowing the most dubious lawsuits to
proceed. Part III concludes by arguing-in a sharp departure from
current law-that a showing of market efficiency should not be
required in market manipulation cases. Part IV discusses several
real-life examples of post-Basic lOb-5 actions alleging manipulative
schemes and shows how courts have required plaintiffs in such
cases to make the same showing of market efficiency required in
misrepresentation cases.
Part V canvasses potential solutions to the problem identified
here and concludes that, although the requirement that plaintiffs
demonstrate market efficiency should be abolished, some gateInitial Public Offering Securities Litigation (IPO IV), 544 F. Supp. 2d 277, 302 (S.D.N.Y.
2008), denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint.
26. 573 F.3d 931, 942-43 (9th Cir. 2009).
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keeping requirement at the class certification stage would be
appropriate, particularly in light of the fact that class certification
in section 10(b) cases nearly always leads to settlement before trial.
To create a logical gatekeeper, the requirement that plaintiffs show
market efficiency should be replaced with a requirement that
plaintiffs make a preliminary showing ofloss causation at the class
certification stage. A showing ofloss causation would (1) provide the
requisite causal connection between the plaintiffs' reliance on the
integrity of the market and the manipulative conduct; (2) focus
attention on the crucial question in any manipulation suit-whether
the alleged manipulation distorted the market price; and (3) not
require any action from Congress or the overruling of any Supreme
Court precedent.
I. 10B-5 ACTIONS AND THE FRAUD ON THE MARKET DOCTRINE

A. Origins of the 1Ob-5 Action
In an effort to restore investor confidence in the wake of the
market crash of 1929, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933
(1933 Act), 27 creating an elaborate system of registration and
disclosure of material information to investors. 28 The next year,
Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934
Act), 29 which sought to address the problem of stock market
manipulation. 30 The 1934 Act forbids various "manipulative" trading
27. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006)).
28. ld.; see also RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 112 (8th ed. 1998).
29. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78oo).
30. Section 2 of the 1934 Act declares that "[n]ational emergencies, ... which burden
interstate commerce and adversely affect the general welfare, are precipitated, intensified,
and prolonged by manipulation and sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security prices."
15 U.S. C. § 78b(4). Popular imagination assigned a great deal of blame for the economic
catastrophe to the so-called "stock pools"-nefarious corporate insiders, banks, and
speculators who allegedly combined to manipulate the stock market, causing wild gyrations
in security prices. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Stock Pools and the Securities Exchange Act, 51
J. FIN. ECON. 343, 344 (1999) ("The purpose of the pools, the Senate concluded, was to
manipulate the price of the chosen stock upward through the pool's purchases, then to sell the
overpriced stock prior to the inevitable price decline."); Norman S. Poser, Stock Market
Manipulation and Corporate Control Transactions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 671 (1986).
Registration and disclosure, however, would be insufficient to stop the widespread
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practices, such as wash sales 31 and matched orders, 32 which could
potentially be used to create a false impression of heightened
trading activity and fool ordinary investors into entering the
market.
In the same vein, the 1934Act also contains a broader prohibition
on trading in a security "for the purpose of inducing the purchase or
sale of such security by others." 33 Such trading-running up the
price of a stock in an attempt to excite ordinary investors into
buying-was thought to be characteristic of manipulative "stock
pools" prior to the crash, 34 and the prohibition of such activities was
said to be "the very heart" of the securities acts. 35 For reasons that
will soon become clear, it would have behooved Congress to maintain a clean distinction between market manipulation, on the one
hand, and fraud, through false disclosure or nondisclosure, on the
other. Instead, section 10(b) of the 1934 Ace 6 serves as a catchall
provision making it "unlawful for any person" to "use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in violation of rules
promulgated by the SEC. 37 The SEC duly promulgated Rule 10b-5,
titled "Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices by
brokers or dealers," 38 which lumps together into a brief, all-encompassing rule the prohibitions on market manipulation and on
material misrepresentations or omissions, categorizing them all as

manipulation thought to be at the root of the stock market collapse. For a detailed discussion
of the legislative history of the 1934 Act, including the concern about market manipulation,
see Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42
STAN. L. REV. 385 (1990).
31. 15 U.S. C.§ 78i(a)(1)(A).
32. ld. § 78i(a)(1)(B),(C).
33. ld. § 78i(a)(2).
34. Steve Thel, Regulation of Manipulation Under Section 1O(b): Securities Prices and the
Text of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1988 CoLUM. Bus. L. REV. 359, 409-11.
35. LoUIS LOSS, FuNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 853 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter
Loss, FuNDAMENTALS) (quoting STAFF OF H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE,
77TH CONG., REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON PROPOSALS FOR
AMENDMENTS TO THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934,
at 50 (Comm. Print 1941)).
36. 15
§ 78j.
37. ld.
38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).

u.s.c.
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species of "fraud" or "deceit." 39 Not surprisingly, such a spare statutory and regulatory framework, stretched over a vast expanse of
potential activities, has yielded a somewhat common-law-style
interpretive approach bycourts. 4°First, although neither Rule lOb-5
nor the underlying statutes explicitly create a private cause of
action, courts have been routinely recognizing an implied cause of
action for more than sixty years. 41 Most importantly for present
purposes, courts have-in the absence of any controlling statutory
language to guide them- invoked common law tort principles to
draw the contours of this private cause of action. 42 Just as Congress
39. Rule 10b-5 reads, in its entirety:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which. operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.

I d.
40. See Louis Loss, The Assault on Securities Act Section 12(2), 105 HARV. L. REV. 908,
910-11 (1992) (suggesting that, because courts have essentially created a new federal tort
from Rule 10b-5, "one should not be shocked to see them invoking Erie-resistant federal
common law in order to invent appropriate qualifications of the new tort"); see also Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) ("When we deal with private actions
under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a
legislative acorn.").
41. The first court to recognize a private cause of action under 10b-5 was apparently the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa.
1946) ("[T]he mere omission of an express provision for civil liability is not sufficient to
negative what the general law implies."). Within five years, Louis Loss could say that the
Kardon court's recognition of an implied cause of action "has ... been followed in almost two
score other cases" and "[n]o judge has expressed himself to the contrary." LOUIS LOSS,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1049-50 (1951) [hereinafter LOSS, REGULATION]. The Supreme Court
ultimately recognized an implied private cause of action without discussion in Superintendent
of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971), and by 1983 described
its existence as ''beyond peradventure." Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380
(1983); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1988) ("Judicial interpretation
and application, legislative acquiescence, and the passage of time have removed any doubt
that a private cause of action exists for a violation of§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and constitutes
an essential tool for enforcement of the 1934 Act's requirements.").
42. See Loss, supra note 40, at 910 ("In the common law tradition, the courts have read
into rule 10b-5 not only scienter, but also the additional elements of justifiable reliance and
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did not maintain a distinction between market manipulation and
fraud, so, too, the courts did not distinguish between the two types
of claims. Instead, the elements for alllOb-5 claims were derived by
analogy to the common law tort of fraud. 43 As a result, in addition
to the requirements of scienter and materiality, courts have also
required showings of justifiable reliance 44 and loss causation. 45
Though treated as separate elements in common law fraud casesand, traditionally, in lOb-5 cases-reliance and loss causation are
both relevant to the question of whether the defendant's fraud can
be considered an actual "cause" of any injury to the plaintiff. As
such, the requirement of actual, justifiable reliance is often styled
"transaction ca:usation," 46 and asks whether the defendant's fraud
caused the plaintiff to enter into the relevant transaction in the first
place. 47 This requirement is distinct from the element of ''loss
causation," which, in a lOb-5 case, asks whether the defendant's
conduct had a market impact that caused harm to the plaintiff. 48 In
a common law fraud case, satisfaction of the reliance element shows
the causal connection between the fraud and the transaction,
causation. It should come as no surprise ... that the courts have added flesh to the bare bones
of 10b-5.").
43. See Jeffrey L. Oldham, Comment, Taking "Efficient Markets" Out of the Fraud-on-theMarket Doctrine After the Priuate Securities Litigation Reform Act, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 995,
1003 (2003) ("Derived primarily from the common law of fraud, the basic elements of a Rule
10b-5 cause of action have become materiality, scienter, reliance, and loss causation.")
(footnotes omitted).
44. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976).
45. See, e.g., Robbins v. Koger Props. Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1997). The term
"loss causation" is a fraught one. In common law deceit, the alleged harm to the plaintiff is
usually manifest, and "loss causation" usually functions simply to ensure that the fraud was
the proximate or "legal" cause of the harm. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342
(2005). Thus, if the plaintiff were fraudulently induced to enter into a contract and was hit
by a bus on the way home from signing the contract, loss causation would not be established.
Many early securities law cases echoed this notion of proximate causation in defining ''loss
causation." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A (1999) (collecting cases). More
recently, courts have held the loss causation requirement to mean more in the 10b-5
context-namely, that plaintiffs must demonstrate that the alleged misrepresentation or
manipulation had a market impact that caused them harm. See Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 345.
This latter sense is the sense in which this Article uses the term.
46. Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 341.
47. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 728 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed.
1984).
48. Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 345; Robbins, 116 F.3d at 1447; see also IX LOUIS Loss &
JOEL SEUGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4405-07 (3d ed. 1992).
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whereas satisfaction ofthe loss causation element shows the causal
connection between the transaction and the injury to the plaintiff.
Together, they work to demonstrate the causal connection between
the fraud and the injury to the plaintiff. 49
Prior to the adoption of the FOTM doctrine, the reliance-that is,
transaction causation-element in a typical lOb-5 claim required
each plaintiff to show that he or she decided to buy or sell the
relevant security in reliance upon the defendant's alleged fraud. 50 At
the same time, loss causation was a more generalized question of
whether the plaintiff "would not have suffered a loss if the facts
were what he believed them to be," because the stock would not
have fallen in value, thus injuring the shareholders. 5 1
B. The Fraud on the Market Doctrine
Although the general outlines of the lOb-5 action were borrowed
by analogy from the common law tort offraud, there are significant
differences between face-to-face bargaining for real goods-the context in which the common law tort of fraud developed-and transactions on modern securities markets. 52 Courts have occasionally
49. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965) ("The reason for [the reliance] requirement ... is to certify that the conduct of the
defendant actually caused the plaintiffs injury." (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS§ 546
(1938))). One might wonder why transaction causation is necessary, even in the context of real
goods. Why should loss causation alone not be sufficient? After all, we may think a buyer is
"injured" in some sense if she receives a good that is of less value to her than she was led to
believe, even if she would have still purchased it had she known the truth. Say, for example,
a good is being sold for $5, and the buyer's subjective utility from buying the good is actually
$6. Because of the seller's misrepresentation, however, the buyer believes the good's
subjective utility to her is $10. The law refuses to recognize this $4 difference as a compensable harm to the plaintiff because the plaintiff still benefits from the transaction-the
subjective utility of the real good she obtained was greater than the price she paid. As will be
explored below, this reasoning is inapplicable to purchases of financial goods.
50. Prior to Basic, the Supreme Court had already created exceptions to the general rule
of actual, justifiable reliance. Perhaps the most noteworthy exception is that plaintiffs need
not demonstrate reliance in 10b-5 cases involving material omissions. Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972). In such cases, the notion of reliance is necessarily hypothetical, so the Court held that proof of materiality-that a reasonable investor
would have considered the information withheld to be important to the investment
decision-can also function to establish a presumption of reliance. Id. at 153-54.
51. LHLC Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 842 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1988).
52. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744-45 (1971) ("[T]he
typical fact situation in which the classic tort of misrepresentation and deceit evolved was
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been forced to adapt the elements of fraud to cope with these
differences. 53 Perhaps the most controversial of these "adaptations"
has been the adoption of the FOTM doctrine.

1. Theoretical Underpinnings of the Fraud on the Market
Doctrine
Prior to the adoption of the FOTM doctrine, the requirement of
individual reliance served as a barrier to class certification in 10b-5
cases. 54 As early as 1967, a treatise suggested that such a requirement was both impractical and theoretically unnecessary in cases
of misrepresentations involving open-market transactions, 55 and
argued that "a 10b-5 reliance requirement in open market transactions could be satisfied by showing that an investor who traded with
reference to market price and conditions could be treated as
indirectly relying on a misrepresentation which affected the
market." 56 Early courts adopting the FOTM theory embraced this
story of indirect reliance-the misrepresentation is heard and relied
upon by some market participants, thus affecting the price in a

light years away from the world of commercial transactions to which Rule 10b-5 is
applicable."). Echoing this sentiment, Barbara Black has noted that "today's rule 10b-5 claim
alleging fraud on a large scale has moved light-years away from the common-law tort."
Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance Requirements
in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435, 454 (1984). At least as early as the
1960s-even before the efficient capital market hypothesis had begun to permeate legal
academia-legal commentators began to argue that common law fraud doctrines were not
always a clean fit for transactions in modern, developed securities markets. See, e.g., Note,
Civil Liability Under Section 1Ob and Rule JOb-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of
Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 670 (1965).
53. See Loss, REGULATION, supra note 41, at 817 ("[T]he courts have repeatedly said that
the fraud provisions in the SEC statutes are not limited to circumstances which would give
rise to a common-law action for deceit."); Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions
Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584, 585 (1975) [hereinafter Note, Reliance
Requirement] ("[T]he courts have gone beyond the common law in defining the nature, scope,
and requirements of the federal action under rule 10b-5.").
54. See supra note 17.
55. See Oldham, supra note 43, at 1006-07.
56. BROMBERG & LoWENFELS, supra note 24, § 7:468; see also Daniel R. Fischel, Use of
Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38
Bus. LAW. 1, 9 (1982).

2011]

MISUSE OF MARKET EFFICIENCY

1125

measurable way, and the plaintiff then reasonably relies on the
price set by the market. 57
This vision of indirect reliance suggested two possible approaches
to the FOTM presumption. First, courts could presume only that the
plaintiff reasonably relied on the market price and still require the
plaintiff to demonstrate loss causation-that "the market price was
in fact artificially affected by false information"58-in order to
connect reliance on the market to the underlying misrepresentation.
Alternatively, courts could presume both reasonable reliance and
loss causation-that is market impact-as long as the plaintiff can
establish that the alleged misrepresentation was "material."59 As
the first circuit court to recognize the FOTM theory explicitly, the
Ninth Circuit made clear that it was adopting the second of these
approaches. 60 In the years prior to Basic, other circuit courts
followed suit. 61 Thus, allegations of a "material" misrepresentation
would suffice to forge both links in the chain of indirect reliance:
(1) a change in market price due to some market participants'
57. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975) ("[An investor] relies
generally on the supposition that the market price is validly set and that no unsuspected
manipulation has artificially inflated the price, and thus indirectly on the truth of the
representations underlying the stock price-whether he is aware of it or not, the price he pays
reflects material misrepresentations."). Do not read too much into the court's use of the term
"manipulation"-the term is not being used in the specific sense reserved for it in this Article.
58. Fischel, supra note 56, at 13.
59. Courts will consider information material "if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important" in making the investment decision. TSC
Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). The intuition underlying this second
approach is that when there is "proof that the deception was material ... [there] is persuasive
circumstantial evidence that a sufficient number of traders in the market did indeed rely."
Note, Reliance Requirement, supra note 53, at 593. The logic is that if the plaintiffs can
establish materiality-that is, a reasonable investor would have found the misrepresentation
important-then it is safe to assume that the misrepresentation actually affected the market
price. Thus, reliance on the market price can be presumed to be indirect reliance on the
misrepresentation.
60. Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906 (stating that "causation is adequately established in the
impersonal stock exchange context by proof of purchase and of the materiality of [the alleged]
representations," and that "[m]ateriality circumstantially establishes the reliance of some
market traders"). The Blackie court also held that the FOTM presumption could be rebutted
if the defendant showed either (1) that the particular plaintiff did not actually rely on the
misrepresentation-no reliance; or (2) that an insufficient number of traders actually relied
on it to cause a change in the stock price-no loss causation. ld. As we will see, the Basic
Court adopted a very similar rebuttable presumption.
61. See, e.g., Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986); Panzirerv. Wolf, 663 F.2d
365, 367 (2d Cir. 1981).
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reliance on the material misrepresentation, and (2) the plaintiffs'
reasonable reliance on this altered market price.
In addition to its important practical advantages for courts, 62 this
"double-presumption" approach to the FOTM theory was given a
crucial theoretical boost in 1982 when Daniel Fischel made the
connection between the FOTM theory and the efficient capital
markets hypothesis (ECMH). 63 Fischel described an efficient capital
market as "one in which the price of stock at a given time is the best
estimate of what the price will be in the future." 64 In practice, when
the current price of a stock is the best estimate of the future price
of the stock, it means that the price reflects all available "information" about that stock. 65 The ECMH allowed Fischel to do two
62. This "double-presumption" approach allows courts to avoid addressing the question
of loss causation-whether, in fact, the misrepresentation had a measurable effect on the
stock price-a question that is often hopelessly entangled with the merits of the lawsuit. By
allowing materiality to suffice at the class certification stage, courts are able to certify classes
while putting off potentially difficult, fact-intensive questions of loss causation until it is
necessary to calculate damages, which is unlikely to ever be the case, given the prevalence of
settlement upon class certification. See Nagareda, supra note 19, at 99.
63. Fischel, supra note 56, at 9-10. Although a district court, In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88
F.R.D. 134, 142-46 (N.D. Tex. 1980), and several other commentators, Michael A. Lynn, Note,
Fraud on the Market: An Emerging Theory of Recouery Under SEC Rule 1Ob-5, 50 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 627, 647-52 (1982); Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143,
1154-56 (1982), also recognized the potential relationship between the FOTM theory and the
ECMH, Fischel's article proved to be a watershed.
64. Fischel, supra note 56, at 4 n.9. To put it in the language of statistics, the price of a
stock in an efficient market is a martingale.
65. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets, A Reuiew of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970). In principle, the ECMH can come in three forms-weak,
semi-strong, and strong-depending on the type of "information" that can be considered as
"fully reflected" in the price of the stock. Id. at 383-84. Weak form efficiency implies that
prices fully reflect any information contained in the past movement of the stock price itself.
Id. at 388. Thus, "an investor cannot enhance his/her ability to select stocks by knowing the
history of successive prices and the results of analyzing them all possible ways." JAMES H.
LORIE, PETER DODD & MARY HAMILTON KIMPTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND
EVIDENCE 56 (2d ed. 1985). Weak form efficiency is also known as the "random walk"
hypothesis, because it suggests that successive price movements are independent of each
other and thus will appear random. Fama, supra, at 386-87. Semi-strong form implies that
prices fully reflect any information that is publicly available and quickly adjust to reflect any
new publicly available information-including potential fraudulent misrepresentations. ld.
at 388. At its limit, this suggests "that efforts to acquire and analyze [public] knowledge
cannot be expected to produce superior investment results." LORIE, DODD & KIMPTON, supra,
at 56. Strong form implies that even nonpublic information-information known to any
market participant-will be fully and quickly reflected in the price. Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market
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things. First, it allowed him to say that it is perfectly reasonable for
individual investors to rely on the market price in efficient
markets-indeed, it would be irrational for them to do otherwise. 66
Because information-including misrepresentations-in prospectuses, earnings reports, press releases, and other types of corporate
disclosures will already be reflected in the market price, there is no
reason investors should read them, or that the law should encourage
them to do so. In fact, "investors would be wasting their money by
doing so." 67 Second, the ECMH allowed Fischel to put a more scientific gloss on the Ninth Circuit's intuition that "[m]ateriality circumstantially establishes the reliance of some market traders," and that
the reliance of some market traders would affect the price, thereby
establishing loss causation. 68 If the semi-strong form of the ECMH
is accepted, 69 all new public material information-including misrepresentations-will by definition rapidly be reflected in the stock
price. 70 The invocation of the ECMH in support of the FOTM
doctrine cements the Ninth Circuit's "double presumption" approach
17teory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1077 (1990).

With certain caveats, empirical studies have tended to confirm the weak and semi-strong
form versions of the ECMH. See, e.g., West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir.
2002) ("[F]ew propositions in economics are better established than the quick adjustment of
securities prices to public information."); LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. at 144 ("[T]ests of market
efficiency show that stock prices adjusted quickly to public announcements concerning the
company: the 'collective action of a sufficient number of market participants buying or selling
the stock causes a very rapid, if not virtually instantaneous, adjustment in price."').
66. Fischel, supra note 56, at 4 ("Because the market price itself transmits .all available
information, investors have no incentive to study other available data.").
67. Id. As a result-and this is sometimes forgotten-Fischel did not merely argue that
reliance should be presumed in cases involving efficient markets, he argued that "[t]he logic
of the fraud on the market theory dictates that the reliance requirement as conventionally
interpreted be discarded altogether." Id. at 11.
68. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975).
69. See supra note 65.
70. Again, Fischel went beyond endorsing the notion in Blackie that allegations oflegally
"materiaf' misrepresentations should suffice to create a presumption of loss causation. See
Fischel, supra note 56, at 7. One of the main thrusts of his article was that, in an efficient
market, abstract legal definitions of "materiality" are unnecessary and probably
counterproductive-it is the absence or presence of a price reaction that tells us whether
information really is new and material. Id. According to Fischel, acceptance of the FOTM
theory, as viewed in light of the ECMH, means "that there is no need in a securities fraud
case for separate inquiries into materiality, reliance, causation, and damages." Id. at 13. The
only inquiry "in open-market transactions should be whether the market price was in fact
artificially affected by false information." Id.
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as the logical approach. 71 The ECMH supports the picture of indirect
reliance and strengthens both links in the resulting chain of
causation. 72 Notably for our purposes, though courts and commentators tended to speak of "10b-5 actions"· in general, the theory
underpinning the FOTM doctrine was developed with fraudulent
misrepresentations in mind, with little or no attention paid to how,
if at all, the theory should apply in the context of market manipulations.73

2. Basic Inc. v. Levinson
The Supreme Court finally took up the question of the FOTM
doctrine in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. The facts of Basic are well-known.
During 1977 and 1978, "Basic made three public statements
denying that it was engaged in merger negotiations." 74 In December
of 1978, however, another company purchased Basic. Former share71. One need not accept Fischel's invitation to drastically reimagine the 10b-5 action to
come to this conclusion. As is detailed in Part I.A.2, the Supreme Court rejected Fischel's
invitation but embraced the FOTM doctrine and the double presumption. In part, the Court's
rejection of Fischel's solution may have stemmed from judicial conservatism-after decades
oftreating 10b-5 actions as analogous to common law fraud, the Court may have thought such
a radical change should come from Congress. In part, it may be because Fischel's approach
would create a procedural quandary-should the key inquiry into "whether the market price
was in fact artificially affected" take place before or after class certification? Fischel, supra
note 56, at 13. Because this inquiry is seemingly determinative of the merits, it seems
inappropriate to do it before class certification. But given that securities suits inevitably settle
upon certification of a class, it seems likely that the inquiry would rarely take place at all if
it were performed after class certification. Nagareda, supra note 19, at 99. Fischel did not
address this problem.
72. One lower court, writing after Basic, has summarized the role of the ECMH in the
FOTM doctrine as follows:
First, the efficient capital market hypothesis allows a court to assume that any
material misrepresentation made by an issuer of securities will quickly and
accurately be reflected in the market price of that issuer's securities, so long as
the market involved is an "efficient" one. Next, it is presumed reasonable for an
investor to rely on the integrity of the market price of any such security. And
finally, because an investor who trades in a particular security can be presumed
to have done so based on the market price of that security, if that market price
reflects some misrepresentation made by the issuer of the security, the trader
can be deemed to have relied on the misrepresentation itself.
In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1355 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (citations omitted).
73. Fischel's article does not mention market manipulations at all. See Fischel, supra note
56.
74. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 227 (1988).
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holders sued Basic and its board of directors, alleging that they
violated section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 by falsely denying the
existence of merger negotiations. 75 The plaintiffs sought to certify a
class of investors who had sold their stock after the first denial of
the merger negotiations but prior to the announcement of the
merger. In certifying a class, the district court permitted a presumption of reliance. 76 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the presumption of
reliance, relying on the FOTM theory and noting that Basic stock
traded "in an impersonal, efficient market." 77 The two questions
before the Supreme Court were whether false denials of preliminary
merger negotiations could be material, and whether a FOTM
presumption of reliance was appropriate. 78 Mter determining that
preliminary merger negotiations could be material/9 the Court took
up the FOTM theory. As with prior commentary and cases, the
Court analyzed the FOTM doctrine in the context of an alleged
fraudulent misrepresentation-the plaintiffs did not allege any
trade-based manipulations. Nor did the Court, in speaking of lOb-5
actions, discriminate between fraudulent misrepresentations and
market manipulations.
As a first step, the Court recommitted itself to the proposition
that "reliance is an element of a Rule lOb-5 cause of action."80 Then,
although denying that its holding required full acceptance of the
ECMH, 81 the Court did, in fact, implicitly adopt a form of the ECMH

75. Id. at 227-28.
76. Id. at 228.
77. Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 751 (6th Cir. 1986).
78. Basic, 485 U.S. at 230. Interestingly, the Court did not address "whether companies
have the freedom to hide preliminary merger negotiations from public scrutiny in order to
make them more likely to come to fruition." Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty:
Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 156. "[W]hether and when securities
law should permit issuers to lie in order to serve their shareholders" was the subject of "a
lively debate" in the wake of Basic. Id.
79. Basic, 485 U.S. at 239-41.
80. Id. at 243. In doing so, the Court declined to follow Fischel's advice to dispense with
the concept of reliance altogether in favor of an exclusive focus on loss causation through
market impact. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
81. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246 n.24 ("We need not determine by adjudication what
economists and social scientists have debated through the use of sophisticated statistical
analysis and the application of economic theory."); id. at 248 n.28 ("By accepting this
rebuttable presumption, we do not intend conclusively to adopt any particular theory of how
quickly and completely publicly available information is reflected in market price.").
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in justifying a presumption of reliance. 82 In particular, the Court
held that a presumption of reliance was appropriate in cases
involving "an open and developed securities market." 83 Crucially,
the Court's implicit acceptance of the principles underlying the
ECMH led it to adopt the indirect reliance approach to the FOTM
doctrine, with its double presumption ofloss causation and reliance.
First, the Court noted that "[r]ecent empirical studies have tended
to confirm ... that the market price of shares traded on welldeveloped markets reflects all publicly available information, and,
hence, any material misrepresentations." 84 The Court then went on
to state that "[a]n investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by
the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price." 85
Having forged the two links of the double presumption, the Court
proceeded to join them by concluding that "[b]ecause most publicly
available information is reflected in market price, an investor's
reliance on any public material misrepresentations ... may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 1Ob-5 action." 86 Beyond the theoretical
82. Id. at 246 n.24 ("For purposes of accepting the presumption of reliance in this case,
we need only believe that market professionals generally consider most publicly announced
material statements about companies, thereby affecting stock market prices."). Justice White,
in dissent, certainly believed that the Court had accepted the presumption based on the
ECMH, and scholars have tended to agree with him. Id. at 250, 253-55 (White, J., dissenting);
Edward S. Adams & David E. Runkle, Solving a Pro{otLnd Flaw in FratLd-on-the-Market
Theory: Utilizing a Derivative of Arbitrage Pricing Theory To MeastLre RLLle 1Ob-5 Damages,
145 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1109 (1997) ("The Court based its adoption of the fraud-on-themarket theory on its implicit assumption of the validity of the principles underlying the
ECMH .... Although the Court did not state its acceptance of the ECMH by name, the Court
unmistakably stated its acceptance of the ECMH in substance."); Macey & Miller, stLpra note
65, at 1077 ("Despite this disclaimer, the Court was adopting the semi-strong version of the
efficient capital markets hypothesis, whether it was aware it was doing so or not.").
83. Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-42, 245-47.
84. Id. at 246.
85. Id. at 247.
86. Id. That the Court adopted the double presumption is emphasized by the examples it
gave for how the presumption may be rebutted. The Court provided three such examples.
First, the defendant can show that "the 'market makers' were privy to the truth," which would
demonstrate "that the market price would not have been affected by the[]
misrepresentations," breaking the "causal connection." Id. at 248. Second, the defendant can
show "truth" on the market-that "news" ofthe misrepresentation leaked out and "dissipated
the effects of the misstatements," again breaking the connection. Id. at 248-49. Finally, the
defendant could show that the individual plaintiff was not "relying on the integrity of the
market," but "sold his shares nevertheless because of other unrelated concerns." Id. at 249.
Thus, in keeping with the vision of indirect reliance, the defendant can rebut the FOTM
presumption by showing either a lack of loss causation or a lack of reliance.
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coherence of the FOTM doctrine in light of the ECMH, practical
concerns of evidence and procedure also motivated the Court's
conclusions. The Court emphasized that presumptions arise "out of
considerations of fairness, public policy, and probability, as well as
judicial economy," suggesting that a presumption of reliance may be
preferable to requiring statutorily favored plaintiffs "to show a
speculative state of facts" at such an early stage in the proceedings.87

3. Implementation by the Lower Courts-The Requirement of an
"Efficient" Market
The Supreme Court's official recognition of the FOTM presumption led to an explosion of securities fraud litigation. 88 No longer
able to argue against the FOTM presumption in general, defendants
at the crucial class certification stage seized upon the Court's
87. I d. at 245. One scholar goes so far as to argue that "Basic cannot be understood except
by appreciating that the Court's response is far more a lesson in civil procedure than financial
economics." Langevoort, supra note 78, at 158. Even if this is an overstatement, it is clear the
Court was alert to considerations of what kinds of evidence a plaintiff can and should be
expected to present at class certification. Adopting the more sweeping double presumption
avoided the need for a fact-intensive inquiry into loss causation at the class certification
stage-an inquiry necessarily intertwined with the merits.
88. The number of suits filed nearly tripled in the three years after Basic, and "continued
to rise dramatically over the next fifteen years." Langevoort, supra note 78, at 179; see also
Vincent E. O'Brien, The Class-Action Shakedown Racket, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1991, at A20
(counting section 11 actions as well). In light of this increase, Fischel's claim that "[i]n all
probability" his approach would "decrease the overall amount of litigation under rule 10b-5"
might strike the modern reader as almost touchingly na!ve. Fischel, supra note 56, at 16. In
fairness to Fischel, the version of the FOTM theory adopted by the Court bears only a
superficial resemblance to the theory he advocated. On the one hand, as noted above, the
Court declined to eliminate the reliance requirement altogether. More importantly, the Court
did not accept the notion that the absence or presence of a market reaction is the only real
measure of the materiality of an alleged misrepresentation. Three years after Basic, in fact,
the Court held that defendants could not avoid liability by arguing that market professionals
had seen through a misrepresentation, thus preventing any impact on the market price. See
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991) (''If it would take a
financial analyst to spot the [misrepresentation], whatever is misleading will remain
materially so, and liability should follow."). This "notion that a statement can be materially
misleading even if informed investors are not fooled (and accordingly price remains
unchanged) is flatly inconsistent with the premises" underlying the FOTM theory, and shows
that, for the Court, ''belie[£] in the informational content of prices ... is merely a one-way
street." Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78
VA. L. REV. 623, 662 n.96 (1992).
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language about "open and developed" markets, and began arguing
that the market for the particular security at issue was not
sufficiently efficient to support the presumption in the individual
case. 89 These arguments-together with the need for some
gatekeeping requirement to staunch the flood of securities fraud
suits-forced courts to formulate "tests" for the required level of
efficiency. Demonstrating the requisite market efficiency quickly
became one of the major hurdles for plaintiffs seeking to bring lOb-5
class actions, and the question of market efficiency took on a
significance that would not be immediately obvious from a casual
reading of Basic's plurality opinion. Basic itself said little about how
"efficient" the relevant market needed to be, or how such efficiency
should be established. The lower courts were left to deal with those
questions themselves. 90
Though lower courts have agreed that a showing of market
efficiency is required to invoke the FOTM presumption, they have
been inconsistent in their approach to determining whether a market is sufficiently efficient. 91 Among the earliest-and still probably
89. Langevoort, supra note 78, at 166-68.
90. Indeed, although Basic unmistakably reflected the Supreme Court's approval of the
FOTM presumption of reliance, it provided relatively little guidance as to how lower courts
should implement the doctrine. See Macey & Miller, supra note 65, at 1077.
91. In Basic itself, the relevant stock was traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
and the Court apparently assumed an efficient market without further discussion. Basic, 485
U.S. at 227-28, 247-50. Some lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead and
assumed market efficiency when the relevant security trades on a major exchange like the
NYSE or National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ). See,
e.g., Anderson v. Transglobe Energy Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1369 (M.D. Fla. 1999)
(finding, without analysis, that a stock listed on the NASDAQ and several Canadian
exchanges traded in an efficient market); Levine v. Metal Recovery Techs., Inc., 182 F.R.D.
102, 107-08 (D. Del. 1998) (finding, without analysis, that a stock listed on the NASDAQ
Small Cap Market traded in an efficient market). Other courts have argued that market
efficiency cannot be assumed based on the exchange on which a security is traded-it is the
market for the individual security itself that must be efficient. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Appel, 165
F.R.D. 479, 504 (W.D. Mich. 1996); Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1281-83 (D.N.J.
1989). Some courts have extended the FOTM presumption to initial public offerings (IPOs)
and securities traded in over-the-counter markets. See, e.g., Endo v. Albertine, 863 F. Supp.
708, 726 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (extending the FOTM presumption to IPOs); Cammer, 711 F. Supp.
at 1297 (extending the FOTM presumption to securities traded in over-the-counter markets).
But see IPO III, 471 F.3d 24, 42 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that "the market for IPO shares is not
efficient"); Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that
"a primary market for newly issued municipal bonds as a matter of law is not efficient"). Still
others have suggested that a slow market reaction to obscure news could call into question
the efficiency of even heavily traded blue-chip stocks. See In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432
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most widely used-tests for market efficiency was a multi-factor test
formulated by a New Jersey district court in Cammer v. Bloom. 92
The so-called "Cammer factors" have proved influential, with courts
sometimes adding additional factors of their own. 93 The result, as
one scholar describes it, was "an ad hoc approach informed by expert
testimony, but in fact largely unconstrained." 94
A related question is when the required showing should be made.
Although Basic itself involved class certification, consensus was
slow to materialize as to whether the FOTM presumption-and the
associated inquiry into market efficiency-needed to be settled at
that stage of the litigation. Courts were torn between the necessity
of deciding the presumption of reliance in order to satisfy Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and the Supreme Court's admonishment
against conducting fact-intensive, merits-related inquiries at the
class certification stage. 95 In the past few years, however, a rough
consensus has emerged that a district court must make a determination-prior to certifying a class-that each of the Rule 23 requirements has been met, even if a Rule 23 requirement overlaps
with a merits issue. 96 Unlike under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
F.3d 261, 269-70 (3d Cir. 2005) (suggesting that if Merck's common stock was slow to respond
to confusing revenue data, it would demonstrate an inefficient market and thus be grounds
for denial of class certification).
92. The Cammer court set forth five factors that could be indicative of market efficiency:
(1) average weekly trading volume, (2) number of securities analysts following the stock,
(3) number of market makers and arbitrageurs, (4) status as an S-3 filer, and (5) responsiveness of the market price to "unexpected corporate events or financial releases." Cammer,
711 F. Supp. at 1286-87.
93. See, e.g., Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 2005) (considering
additional factors, including market capitalization and bid-ask spread).
94. Langevoort, supra note 78, at 167-68 ("[W]ading into the mind-numbing data
defendants (and thus plaintiffs as well) often put forward in their expert reports creates the
illusion that there is a bright-line distinction."); see also Paul A. Ferrillo et al., The "Less
Than" Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis: Requiring More Proof from Plaintiffs in Fraudon-the-Market Cases, 78 ST. JOHN'SL. REV. 81, 83 (2004); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Proving
Markets Inefficient: The Variability of Federal Court Decisions on Market Efficiency in
Cammer v. Bloom and Its Progeny, 10 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 303, 319-20 (2002).
95. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974).
96. See !PO III, 4 71 F.3d at 42; In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir.
2005); Blades v. Monsanto, 400 F.3d 562,575 (8th Cir. 2005); Unger, 401 F.3d at 319; Gariety
v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P., 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he factors spelled out in Rule
23 must be addressed through findings, even if they overlap with issues on the merits.");
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 166 (3d Cir. 2001);
Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[A] judge should make
whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary under Rule 23," even if "the judge must
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12(b)(6), courts are required to make "factual findings" that all of
the requirements for Rule 23 class certification are met. If the
plaintiff seeks to invoke the FOTM presumption, the need to make
such findings necessarily requires rigorous scrutiny of efficiency
claims at the class certification stage, a fact-intensive inquiry that
can entail lengthy discovery. 97
The net result is that district courts are required to perform a
searching and relatively wide-ranging inquiry into market efficiency
prior to class certification. In a world where concerns over the costs
and efficacy of securities litigation are increasingly widespread, this
inquiry has become one of the primary gatekeepers to class certification. 98 Indeed, given that the overwhelming majority of lOb-5
actions settle upon certification of a class 99-seemingly with little
make a preliminary inquiry into the merits.").
97. See, e.g., IPO III, 471 F.3d at 41-42; Unger, 401 F.3d at 322; Gariety, 368 F. 3d at 366.
This trend toward increased scrutiny of market efficiency at the class certification has
arguably been reinforced by two legal changes that were, at least in part, driven by concerns
about the swarm of securities fraud class actions spawned by Basic: (1) the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) and (2) the 2003 amendments to Rule 23. The PSLRA, with
its overt skepticism of securities class actions, cast doubt on the Basic Court's assumption
that private class actions are a legislatively favored remedy for securities fraud, suggesting
that greater judicial scrutiny would be appropriate. The initial bill, H.R. 10, was drafted by
then-Congressman Christopher Cox and would have undone Basic altogether. See Common
Sense Legal Reforms Act, H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 204 (1995). Ironically, in light of the fact that
a stringent test for market efficiency became one of the primary roadblocks to class
certification, the PSLRA's damages provision actually suggests congressional skepticism of
the ECMH. See Nathaniel Carden, Comment, Implications of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 for Judicial Presumptions of Market Efficiency, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 89495 (1998); Oldham, supra note 43, at 1028-29; Michael Y. Scudder, Comment, The
Implications of Market-Based Damages Caps in Securities Class Actions, 92 Nw. U. L. REV.
435, 461 (1997).
The 2003 amendments to Rule 23 made two relevant changes. First, they eliminated the
provision from prior Rule 23(c)(1)(C) allowizi.g "conditional" certification of classes. FED. R. Crv.
P. 23 advisory committee's note. Second, Rule 23(c)(1)(A) was altered, replacing the
requirement to certify a class "as soon as practicable" with an instruction to certify "at an
early practicable time." Id. The advisory committee's notes state that "[a) court that is not
satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met should refuse certification until they
have been met," and instruct courts that "it is appropriate to conduct controlled discovery into
the 'merits,' limited to those aspects relevant to making the certification decision on an
informed basis." Id.
98. See Douglas C. Conroy & Johanna S. Wilson, Class Actions-Evening the Playing
Field: Stress- Testing the Efficient Market Hypothesis, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 26, at 1127
(June 26, 2006).
99. See Nagareda, supra note 19, at 99.
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regard for the merits 100-the need for a gatekeeping requirement of
some sort is manifest, and may help explain the recent consensus. 101
The question addressed in Part III is whether this particular gatekeeping requirement has any logical force in cases alleging market
manipulation, even if it is defensible for cases involving material
misrepresentations. Before we can address this question, a better
understanding of "market manipulation" is needed.

II. MARKET MANIPULATION
A. Defining Market Manipulation
One of the main difficulties in talking and thinking about how to
treat claims of market manipulation is the lack of an agreed-upon
meaning for "market manipulation." Beyond banning wash sales
and matched orders, the relevant statutes do not define the term,
and courts have struggled to find a meaningful definition. 102 Before
the application of the FOTM doctrine to market manipulation
claims can be examined, some common misunderstandings must be
cleared away, and a plausible definition of manipulative conduct
must be identified.
The most obvious types of trade-based manipulations are the
types of wash sales and matched orders alleged by the SEC in the
case discussed in the Introduction. The potential class of "market
manipulations," however, is broader than these economically
fictitious transactions. Fischel and Ross make the most thorough
and satisfying attempt to define this broader class of market
manipulation. 103 In their analysis, they show that a meaningful
100. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 596-97 (1991); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit:
Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 61, 79 n.40 (1991).
101. See West v. Prudential Sec., 282 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[V]ery few securities
class actions are litigated to conclusion, so review [of the district court's interpretation of the
FOTM] may be possible only through the Rule 23(f) device.").
102. "[E]ven though both have the prevention of manipulation as a primary goal," neither
the Securities Exchange Act nor the Commodity Exchange Act provides a definition of
"market manipulation." Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit
"Manipulation" in Financial Markets?, 105 HARv. L. REV. 503, 506 (1991); see also Loss,
FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 35, at 860 n. 75 ("[T]he word 'manipulative' as used in§§ lO(b) and
15(c)(1) has never had any precise meaning.").
103. Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 506.
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definition of manipulation involving real trades (as opposed to
economically fictitious trades) must be subjective-that is, it must
depend on the intent of the trader. 104 After rejecting attempts to
define manipulation more broadly, 105 Fischel and Ross settle on a
104. ld. at 510. See also ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 102 (2d Cir.
2007) ("[I]n some cases scienter is the only factor that distinguishes legitimate trading from
improper manipulation."). In fact, Fischel and Ross go on to conclude that wash sales and
matched orders-the most obvious types of market manipulations-are better analyzed as a
"species of fraud" than as a separate category of market manipulations. Fischel & Ross, supra
note 102, at 510-12. Although this argument may have merit, it is uncomfortable doctrinally,
as wash sales and matched orders are among the few potentially "manipulative" practices
explicitly barred by the securities laws. See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(1) (2006). In any case, one need
not go so far for the purposes of this Article.
105. Specifically, Fischel and Ross reject attempts to define manipulation as conduct
"designed to do one of three things: (1) interfere with the free play of supply and demand; (2)
induce people to trade; or (3) force a security's price to an artificial level." Fischel & Ross,
supra note 102, at 507. They reject the first formulation because the term "interfere" is
"circular absent a definition of manipulation." Id. All trades and traders are a part of the "play
of supply and demand." Id. A large investor who places a large order in the honest belief that
the stock is a good investment will alter the supply and demand in the same fashion as one
who places a large order for manipulative purposes. In attempting to define manipulation, the
entire problem is to distinguish between demand that is in some sense "legitimate" and
demand that is somehow "illegitimate." Without some definition of manipulation "that
distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate demand, the concept of interference with
supply and demand does not advance the inquiry." ld.
Although acknowledging that "inducement of trading ... is sometimes said to be the essence
of manipulation," Thel, supra note 34, at 410, Fischel and Ross reject this second formulation
as ''hopelessly overbroad." Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 507. At one extreme, of course,
every bid or offer is intended to induce someone to trade--the counterparty to the trade. ld.
at 507-08. Clearly this cannot be what is meant. There are also many perfectly legitimate
situations in which firms or individuals may act to induce trades by people other than
counterparties. Most obviously, any time a firm discloses new information about the "value
or riskiness" of the firm's securities, it is "likely [to]lead to increases in the volume of trading
and thus can be said to have 'induced' trading." Id. at 508. Less obviously, a firm may
purchase its own shares or change its capital structure, in part "as a way of communicating
information about the value of its securities." ld. at 508 & n.27 (collecting sources). Similarly,
prominent executives will often purchase shares in order to "signal confidence" in the
prospects of the firm. See Eric Martin & Michael Tsang, lmmelt's GE Purchases Signal Sell
as Insiders Buy, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 17, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=aLCAhR7E5RJE (General Electric CEO Jeffrey Immelt's share purchase
"'reflects his confidence in the company,' said Gary Sheffer, a spokesman for [GE]."). Such
activities are not generally thought of as manipulative.
The third formulation-forcing security prices to an artificiallevel-"has intuitive appeal
because creation of artificial prices, unlike trading, is socially undesirable." Fischel & Ross,
supra note 102, at 508. The problem with this formulation as an attempt to craft an
"objective" definition of manipulative conduct-not depending on the intent of the trader-is
the inability to determine whether a price level is "artificial." What is to distinguish between
a manipulator and an investor who trades in the genuine belief that prices will move in a
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definition focused on "profitable trades made with 'bad' intent"that is, trades where
(1) the trading is intended to move prices in a certain
direction;
(2) the trader has no belief that the prices would move in
this direction but for the trade; and
(3) the resulting profit comes solely from the trader's
ability to move prices and not from his possession of
valuable information. 106
This definition-together with economically fictitious transactions
like wash sales and matched orders-will be the definition of
market manipulation used in this Article.

B. Real-Life Examples of Alleged Market Manipulation
The contours of this definition become clearer by examining reallife examples of alleged market manipulation. Below are five cases
involving alleged manipulation 107-three criminal prosecutions
given direction, but who proves to be mistaken, with prices ultimately moving in the other
direction? "Trading based on a genuine belief that prices will ultimately move in the direction
of the trades is the essence of nonmanipulative trading," but the third proposed formulation
provides nothing to distinguish it from manipulation. ld. at 509.
More subtly,"[ d]efining manipulation by reference to whether the trades move prices closer
to their correct level" could threaten "property rights in information." ld. "[T]rades, as well
as disclosures, can reveal information." ld. Just as share purchases by a firm's CEO can signal
confidence based on the presumably superior information possessed by the CEO, trades by
other investors can also signal the presence of new or superior information. Ronald J. Gilson
& Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 572-79
(1984). If trades were perfectly informative, however, it would destroy the ability of investors
to profit from generating new information, imperiling the very mechanisms on which market
efficiency depends. See id.; Sanford Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets
Where Trades Have Diverse Information, 31 J. FIN. 573, 585 (1976) ("The price system can be
maintained only when it is noisy enough so that traders who collect information can hide that
information from other traders."). In order to preserve incentives for investors to acquire
information in the first place-and thus fulfill the information-generating function of
markets-"[t]raders must be allowed to disguise their trades to avoid disclosing the
information they possess to other traders." Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 509-10. A
definition of market manipulation built around forcing prices to an artificial level would
threaten the ability of traders to disguise their trades.
106. Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 510.
107 · The actual facts and motivations in each of the examples are, of course, hotly disputed.
Indeed, the conviction in United States v. Mulheren was ultimately overturned. 938 F.2d 364,
372 (2d Cir. 1991). In lieu of inserting an unsightly "allegedly" into every clause, the
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examined by Fischel and Ross, 108 and two recent, prominent lOb-5
class actions. 109

1. United States v. GAF Corporation
In October of 1986, GAF Corporation was looking to sell a large
block of the approximately ten million shares of Union Carbide it
had acquired in an unsuccessful takeover attempt. 110 GAF desired
to boost the market price of Union Carbide stock, in hopes of
receiving a better price for its shares in a negotiated transaction
pegged to the market price. 111 To do so, GAF asked Jeffries & Co., a
broker-dealer, to make open-market purchases of Union Carbide
stock to drive the closing price above $22 on October 29 and 30, "and
guaranteed Jeffries & Co. against any loss." 112 Jeffries & Co. proceeded to do so, 113 and on November 10, GAF sold five million shares
in an off-market transaction-allegedly receiving $5 million more
than it would have absent the manipulation. 114

allegations of defendant conduct and motivation will be addressed as if they were true for
each of the cases discussed. This is, of course, not necessarily the case. At this point, these
cases are simply intended to give the reader tangible examples of manipulative conduct. The
exact mechanism by which each of the following schemes was alleged to have affected
prices-and by which the defendants were alleged to profit-is discussed in Part ILC.
108. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364; United States v. GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1991);
United States v. Milken, 759 F. Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see Fischel & Ross, supra note 102,
at 527-34. Although these three examples all led to criminal prosecutions, the types of
manipulations alleged could easily support 10b-5 actions, as well.
109. Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); IPO I,
241 F. Supp. 2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
110. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 527 & n.97 (citing Indictment, United States
v. GAF Corp., No. 88 Cr. 962 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1988)); Stephen Labaton, GAF Fined; Executive
Sentenced, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1990, at 31.
111. Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 527-28.
112. Id. at 528.
113. Jeffries & Co. purchased approximately 60,000 shares near the close of trading on
October 29, and approximately 40,000 shares near the close of trading on October 30. Id. As
a result, "Union Carbide closed at $22 ... on October 29," and at "$22-7/8 on the [NYSE] and
$22-3/8 on the Pacific Stock Exchange" on October 30. Id. "Jeffries & Co. sold [these] shares
on November 3 and 4 at a loss. On November 6 and 7, Jeffries & Co. purchased an additional
20,500 shares shortly before the close of trading," selling them November 10-12 without loss.
I d.
114. Id.

2011]

MISUSE OF MARKET EFFICIENCY

1139

2. United States v. Milken
Wickes Corporation, an investment banking client of Michael
Milken and Drexel Burnham Lambert, had "approximately eight
million shares of ... convertible exchangeable preferred stock"
outstanding as of April of 1985. 115 Wickes had an option to redeem
the preferred shares at $2.50 at any time prior to May of 1988 if the
closing price of Wickes common stock was at any point greater than
or equal to $6-1/8 for at least twenty of thirty consecutive trading
days. 116 As of April22, 1986, 'Wickes common stock had closed at or
above [this threshold] on nineteen out of twenty-eight consecutive
trading days." 117 Thus, a closing price at or above $6-118 on either of
the next two trading days would allow Wickes to redeem the
shares. 118
Seeking to make certain the necessary conditions were met,
Milken asked Ivan Boesky's organization to purchase enough
Wickes stock to ensure that it would close at $6-1/8, and guaranteed
Boesky against any resulting trading losses. 119 During the last half
hour of trading on April 23, 1986, Boesky's organization purchased
1.9 million shares of Wickes stock, which it later sold at a loss. 120
The stock closed at $6-118 on April 23, and Wickes redeemed the
preferred shares on April29. 121 Drexel Burnham Lambert received
a $2.3 million underwriting fee for the redemption. 122

3. United States v. Mulheren
In 1985, Ivan Boesky (again!) accumulated approximately 3.4
million shares of Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. (G&W). 123 Boesky
entered into discussions with G&W's chairman about either taking
115. ld. at 530 & n.121 (citing Indictment at 55-56, United States v. Milken (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(No. 89 Cr. 41)).
116. ld. at 530. This kind of provision is similar to what is known as an "Asian option," and
is often intended to reduce the risk of manipulation.
117. ld.
118. ld.
119. ld.
120. ld.
121. ld.
122. ld.
123. United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 366 (2d Cir. 1991).
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control of G& W or selling his shares back to the company at $45 per
share. 124 On October 16, 1985, with the stock trading at $44-3/4,
G&W's chairman expressed willingness to buy the shares back in a
block transaction, but only at the prevailing price on the NYSE. 125
The next morning, Boesky called John Mulheren, chief trader for
Jamie Securities Co., and told him that he ''liked" G&W stock and
that "it would be great if it traded at 45." 126 Between 11:00 a.m. and
11:10 a.m., Mulheren placed a combination of limit and market
orders, 127 and at 11:17 a.m., Boesky successfully sold his 3.4 million
shares back to G&W at the prevailing market price of $45 per
share. 128 The stock closed at $43-5/8, and Mulheren sold his shares
at the end of the day at a loss. 129
All three of the preceding cases meet our definition of manipulation: (1) the trading was intended to boost the price above a certain
level; (2) the defendants did not, apparently, believe the price would
move in that direction absent the manipulative trades; and (3) the
profits came from the negotiated off-market sales (in GAF and
Mulheren) or underwriting fees (in Wickes).

4. In re IPO Securities Litigation
The manipulation alleged in In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation was both more systematic and less straightforward
than in the cases discussed so far. 130 The underwriters of initial
public offerings (IPOs) of hot tech companies during the dot-com
bubble "conditioned allocations of shares at the offer price on
124. Id.
125. Id. at 367.
126. Id.
127. Mulheren purchased a total of 75,000 shares of G&W stock at prices between $44-3/5
and $45. Id. at 367-68.
128. Id. at 366, 368.
129. Id. at 368.
130. In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation was a sprawling mass of thousands
of individual securities class actions against 55 underwriters and 310 issuers in the wake of
the dot-com collapse in 2001. IPO III, 471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2006). These cases were
aggregated by issuer, resulting in 310 consolidated actions. Id. The plaintiffs in these class
actions made allegations of multiple-sometimes contradictory-forms of misconduct. For
present purposes, this Article will focus exclusively on the allegations of market manipulation
and will, as above, treat the allegations as true for the sake of clarity. See supra note 108.
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agreements to purchase shares in the aftermarket." 131 These "tie-in
agreements" with the IPO allocants required the allocants to make
aftermarket purchases at escalating prices-a practice known as
''laddering"-which would create the illusion of market "momentum."132 By unloading their shares into this momentum, "[I] adderers
could stand to profit from such tie-in agreements by selling their
large allocation of IPO shares as well as their after-IPO purchases
at inflated prices resulting from the laddering activities." 133 The
underwriters, in turn, would "profit by receiving higher than normal commissions from the ladderers," or from other types of kickbacks.134 Although somewhat more complicated than the other
manipulations we have seen, laddering still fits comfortably into our
definition: (1) the allocants' trading is intended to move the price
upward, creating an illusion of momentum; (2) the trading is not
motivated by a genuine belief that the shares would otherwise go
up; 135 and (3) the allocants' profit came from selling into the
momentum created by their own laddering trades, not from any new
information. Similarly, the investment banks profited by receiving
kickbacks from the allocants.

5. Desai v. Deutsche Bank Securities
Desai v. Deutsche Bank Securities Ltd. is another securities class
action, filed by shareholders of Genesislntermedia, Inc. (GENI). 136
Deutsche Bank masterminded the manipulative scheme together
with officers of G ENI. 137 The officers of G ENI engaged in securities
131. IPO III, 471 F.3d at 27. The "aftermarket" simply refers to the open, public market
for the shares following the IPO.
132. See Joshua Ronen & Bharat Sarath, On the Feasibility of Laddering, in HANDBOOK
OF QUANTITATIVE FINANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT 843, 843 (Cheng-Few Lee, Alice C. Lee &
John Lee eds., 2010). For more information on laddering, see generally Qing Hao, Laddering
in Initial Public Offerings, 85 J. FIN. ECON~ 102 (2007).
133. Ronen & Sarath, supra note 132, at 843.
134. Id.
135. The allocants and underwriters allegedly knew the issuing companies were of low
quality. IPO III, 4 71 F.3d at 43-44.
136. 573 F.3d 931,933 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). At the time of the manipulation, GENI
stock traded on the NASDAQ. Id.
137. Id. The version of the alleged scheme presented here is somewhat simplified. For
greater detail, see Stephenson v. Deutsche Bank AG, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1045-51 (D. Minn.
2003).
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loans, lending unregistered shares to a broker-dealer in exchange
for cash collateral to the officers. 138 Under the terms of the securities
loans, as the value of the securities increased (or decreased), the
amount of cash collateral would also increase (or decrease), with
interest paid to the borrowers also increasing (or decreasing). 139
"Adjustments [to the amount of collateral and the interest payments]-marking the securities to the market-[were] made
daily." 140 The shares were ultimately reloaned to Deutsche Bank,
with "a chain of broker-dealers" interposed between Deutsche Bank
and the initial broker-dealer "in order to increase the amount of
capital for the scheme and to insulate Deutsche Bank from any
fallout should the scheme collapse." 141 The GENI officers used the
cash collateral received for their shares to "day-trade in GENI's
publicly traded shares." 142 This trading created a misleading
"appearance of investor demand" that, in turn, inflated the stock
price. 143 The higher stock price "required the borrowers of G ENI
stock ... to provide more cash collateral to feed the cycle." 144 "By
September 11,2001, the scheme had driven GENI's stock price from
$12 per share to over $52 per share." 145 When the markets reopened
on September 17, following the terrorist attacks of September 11,
GENI's price collapsed, reaching $9 per share by September 25. 146
As the price collapsed, ''borrowers of the stock, starting with
Deutsche Bank, demanded their cash collateral back." 147 Deutsche
Bank, at the end of the chain of borrowers, "was able to recover
nearly all the collateral it had pledged, [but] the intermediary
broker-dealers were not so lucky," as the GENI officers had spent
the bulk of the cash collateral. 148 "Thus, Deutsche Bank had profited
138. Desai, 573 F. 3d at 934.
139. I d. As the circuit court pointed out, "[t]his is not a typical creditor-debtor relationship,
for the borrower, instead of the lender, receives a stream of income that resembles interest
payments." Id. at 934 n.3. The court goes on to note that it may be helpful to think of the
arrangement as "a loan of money secured by stock." Id.
140. Id. at 934.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 934-35.
145. Id. at 935.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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through the [inflated interest] payments it received, [and still]
managed to recover almost [all of] the cash collateral it had advanced."149 The scheme alleged in Desai is slightly confusing, but
still squarely within our definition of manipulation: (1) the GENI
officers' day-trading-masterminded by Deutsche Bank-was intended to create a false impression of investor interest, causing the
price to rise; (2) the trading was not motivated by a genuine belief
that the shares would otherwise go up; and (3) the profits obtained
by the GENI officers and Deutsche Bank came from the increased
cash collateral and interest payments, respectively, received as a
result of the securities loans-not from any new information.

C. Conditions for Successful Market Manipulation
With these examples of alleged market manipulations in mind, it
is possible to examine the types of situations in which manipulations are likely to succeed, and those in which they are likely to fail.
Fischel and Ross postulate that "[p]rofitable (successful) manipulations require two conditions: first, trading must cause the price of
the relevant security to rise; and second, the manipulator must be
able to sell at a price higher than the price at which the manipulator
purchased (plus transactions costs incurred)." 150 In turn, trades can
cause prices to rise in two ways: (1) directly, through liquidity or
demand effects or (2) indirectly, through information effects. 151

1. Liquidity and Demand Effects
The most obvious mechanism by which trading could cause prices
to rise is that the trades themselves directly move prices by
increasing demand and reducing supply. 152 Indeed, "[m]ost discussions of manipulation assume that there is a direct relationship
between trading and price movements." 153 Three of the five manipulative schemes described above (GAF, Milken, andMulheren) appear
149. Id.
150. Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 512. As is discussed infra notes 168-69 and
accompanying text, this second condition is less essential.
151. Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 514-16.
152. See id. at 515-17.
153. Id. at 513.
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to fit this mold-swamping the market with orders to create a brief
uptick in prices. The reality, however, is not always so simple. The
market for financial securities is, in important respects, completely
unlike the familiar markets for real goods like cars or carrots, in
which sloping supply and demand curves meet to set a marketclearing price.
Judge Easterbrook explained this vividly-if somewhat caustically-in West v. Prudential Securities, Inc. 154 In West-a case involving a nonpublic misrepresentation regarding Jefferson Savings
Bancorp stock 155-Judge Easterbrook took to task plaintiffs' expert,
who assumed "that all trades affect prices by raising demand ... as
if there were an economic market in 'Jefferson Savings stock' as
there is in dill pickles or fluffy towels." 156 As Judge Easterbrook
pointed out, "investors do not want Jefferson Savings stock (as if
they sought to paper their walls with beautiful certificates); they
want monetary returns (at given risk levels), returns that are
available from many financial instruments." 157 The result is that
"[t]here are so many substitutes for any one firm's stock that the
effective demand curve is horizontal[,] ... not sloped like the demand
curve for physical products." 158
Of course, Judge Easterbrook is talking about efficient markets, 159
and "[o]ne fundamental attribute of efficient markets is that
information, not demand in the abstract, determines stock prices." 160
The situation is different in relatively inefficient markets. In an
154. 282 F.3d 935 (7th Cir. 2002).
155. ld. at 936-38. This nonpublic misrepresentation was alleged to have affected the
market price through the trades of the misled individuals. Id.
156. !d. at 939.
157. Id.; see also Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 513-14 ("Investors hold securities to
obtain a stream of future income that can be used to finance future consumption and
investment. To achieve this goal, they can choose from many possible combinations of
available assets.") (citations omitted).
158. West, 282 F.3d at 939. See also Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 513-14 ("Portfolio
theory provides powerful reasons to believe that demand and supply [for stocks] are elastic ....
[Thus,] a high percentage of block trades occurs at the existing market price.").
159. The plaintiffs' expert in West "took the view that the market for Jefferson Savings
securities is efficient," so that the plaintiffs could take advantage of the FOTM presumption.
West, 282 F.3d at 939.
160. RICHARD A. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS
15-18, 25-46 (2d ed. 1983); Id. (citing Myron S. Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution
Versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45 J. Bus. 179 (1972)).
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inefficient market, liquidity and price pressure effects can begin to
be significant and cause large block trades to have an impact on
price. 161 Such liquidity costs often take the form of a wide bid-ask
spread, which compensates market makers for serving as intermediaries until a counterparty can be found. 162 Simply by placing a
market purchase order, a would-be manipulator can often increase
the observed market price by the amount of the spread, which can
be significant in thinly traded stocks. 163 By continually swamping
the supply of ready sellers, a manipulator could, therefore, conceivably raise quoted prices.
Fischel and Ross also discuss "price pressure" effects, which could
be caused by trading "if the demand and supply for securities are
not perfectly elastic." 164 If the available supply of an individual
security is not bottomless, and that "securit[yl possess[es] unique
characteristics" such that "perfect substitutes do not exist," then a
downward-sloping demand curve can result. 165 As a result, "increases in supply or demand can cause price changes," 166 just as they
do for most real goods-like dill pickles and fluffy towels.
Two points about liquidity and price pressure effects require
emphasis. First, both effects are likely to be symmetrical-that is,
any change in price caused by manipulative trades is likely to be
offset when the manipulative trades are unwound. "If purchases
increase the demand and thus the price, sales will have the opposite
effect." 167 The same is true of liquidity effects. 168 But, as the above
161. Fischel and Ross describe "liquidity" effects as follows:
An investor who wants to buy or sell a large quantity of shares immediately may
be unable to do so at the market price because at that moment there are not
enough market participants willing to take the other side ofthe trade. To induce
others to participate, a buyer (seller) may have to pay a premium (sell at a
discount). Such premiums (discounts) compensate intermediaries for the costs
of maintaining a short (long) position until another investor willing to sell (buy)
can be found.
Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 515-16.
162. Id. at 516.
163. Id. at 516, 518.
164. Id. at 516.
165. Id.; see also Andrei Shleifer, Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. FIN.
579, 588-89 (1986).
166. Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 516.
167. Id. at 519.
168. This symmetry led Fischel and Ross to conclude that such manipulative schemes fail
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examples show, the manipulator does not necessarily need to profit
from unwinding the manipulative trades themselves in order for the
scheme as a whole to be profitable. In all but the IPO case, the bulk
of the profits came from contractual payments tied to the market
price of a security-not from being able to sell stock on the open
market at artificially inflated prices. 169 Thus, the symmetrical
nature of liquidity and price pressure effects does not mean they
cannot be the basis of successful manipulations.
The second point-which is even more important for present
purposes-is that liquidity and price pressure effects are far more
likely to be appreciable in inefficient markets than in efficient
markets. To say that an efficient market will be difficult to manipulate is practically tautological at a theoretical level-a good working
definition of an efficient market for a security is one in which
the second requirement for a successful manipulation-that the manipulator be able to sell
at a higher price than the price at which he purchased-and thus are "completely selfdeterring." Id.
169. In GAF, the profits came from a negotiated bulk sale of shares with the purchase price
tied to the prevailing market price. See United States v. GAF, 928 F.2d 1253, 1256 (2d Cir.
1991); see also supra Part II.B.l. In Milken, the profits came from investment banking fees
that followed from triggering a contractual right to call preferred stock. See United States v.
Milken, 759 F. Supp. 109, 115-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see also supra Part II.B.2. InMulheren, the
profits again came from a negotiated bulk sale of shares with the purchase price tied to the
prevailing market price. See United States v. Mulheren, 928 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1991); see
also supra Part II.B.3. In Desai, the profits came from the cash collateral and interest
payments received as part of a series of securities loans. See Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd.,
573 F.3d 931, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); see also supra Part II.B.5. Only in IPO did
at least some portion of the profits stem from selling stock on the open market at artificially
inflated prices. Even there, though, much of the ladderers' profits came from selling their
initial allocation of IPO shares, which were allegedly intentionally underpriced. See IPO III,
471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2006); see also supra Part II.B.4.
Fischel and Ross refer to these types of schemes as "contract-based manipulations," and
argue that contractual counterparties are most likely able to provide themselves with
adequate protections against manipulative conduct by contract or price in the lack of such
protections. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 523-25. Although this is almost certainly
true, and may suggest that the contractual counterparties should not have a claim for
recovery, it does not follow, as Fischel and Ross suggest, that this ability eliminates the need
to prohibit such manipulations at all. The contractual counterparties do not bear all the costs
of a successful manipulation-third parties who purchase at artificially inflated prices will
also be injured, and the efficient functioning of the market itself will be impaired. The
fundamental purpose of the securities laws is "[t]o insure to the multitude of investors the
maintenance offair and honest markets," Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d
787, 794 (2d Cir. 1969) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-1283, at 11 (1934)), not simply to protect the
counterparties directly harmed by contract-based manipulations.
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(1) the demand curve is horizontal 170 and (2) there are sufficient
arbitrageurs to take the opposite side of any trade that would move
the price away from the best guess as to its fundamental value. 171
Such a market would be immune to manipulation.
Even at a practical level, however, it is easy to see that liquidity
and price pressure manipulations are far more likely to have
appreciable effects in inefficient markets. It is now possible to
return to the example from the beginning of the Article with a more
refined intuition. 172 For which security would an aspiring manipulator have more luck appreciably moving the price using liquidity
effects: a blue-chip stock like Microsoft, which has a bid-ask spread
that rarely exceeds a few cents, usually less than 0.1 percent of the
share price, and more than fifty million shares changing hands
daily? 173 Or a cow-chip stock like Odyssey Marine Exploration,
which frequently has a bid-ask spread of nearly 10 percent of the
share price, and has only three hundred thousand shares changing
hands on a typical day? 174
Likewise, is a manipulator likely to be able to tilt the demand
curve for Microsoft, which has a market capitalization in the
hundreds of billions of dollars and well over $1 billion in shares
traded on an average day? 175 If the available supply of Microsoft
shares is not actually infinite, it is close enough for most purposes.
As Fischel and Ross point out, "[t)o the extent that the evidence
supports the existence of a price pressure effect, it indicates that
securities have supply and demand elasticities no smaller in
magnitude than 1.'>176 This means that a manipulator would need to
buy at least 1 percent of a company's outstanding shares-a
purchase that would be in the billions of dollars for Microsoft-in
order to raise the share price by a measly 1 percent. The would-be
manipulator might again find the going easier with Odyssey, with
170. Brett W. King, The Use of Supermajority Voting Rules in Corporate America: Majority
Rule, Corporate Legitimacy, and Minority Shareholder Protection, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 895, 924
(1996).
171. Oldham, supra note 43, at 1016.
172. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
173. See Yahoo! Finance, Microsoft Corp., supra note 12.
17 4. See Yahoo! Finance, Odyssey Marine Exploration Inc., http://www.fmance.yahoo.com/
q?s=OMEX (last visited Jan. 27, 2011).
17 5. See Yahool Finance, Microsoft Corp., supra note 12.
176. Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 518.

1148

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1111

a market capitalization of less than $100 million and only a few
hundred thousand dollars worth of shares trading on any given
day.I77

2. Information Effects
Aside from direct liquidity or price pressure effects, manipulative
trading can have a more subtle effect on prices through "information
effects." 178 In short, manipulators, through their trading activity,
can affect prices by creating a false belief in other traders that the
trading reflects the presence of new information. This false belief
can be relatively sophisticated-a belief by sophisticated investors
that the manipulator possesses some new nonpublic information-or
177. See Yahoo! Finance, Odyssey Marine Exploration Inc., supra note 174. Even stocks
that normally trade in highly efficient markets can exhibit surprisingly dramatic liquidity
effects under certain circumstances, as occasionally occurs in a short squeeze. For example,
on January 25,2010, a number of investment funds flied a claim against Porsche arising from
a massive short squeeze triggered when Porsche made a surprise announcement that it had
gained control of 74 percent of Volkswagen's voting shares. Posting of Zachery Kouwe to
Dealbook, http:l/dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/25/hedge-funds-sue-porsche-for-1-billionlost-on-vw (Jan. 25, 2010, 14:17 EST). With almost all of the remaining shares either stateowned or tied up in index funds, short-sellers were forced to close their positions at hugely
inflated prices, more than tripling Volkswagen's share price and briefly making it the world's
largest company by market capitalization. Id. This violent liquidity shock came despite the
fact that the market for Volkswagen stock is normally extremely efficient.
The so-called "flash crash" of May 6, 2010, provides an even more dramatic example. Broad
market indexes fell by up to 10 percent, with the Dow Jones Industrial Average losing more
than 600 points in approximately 5 minutes. Tom Lauricella, Market Plunge Baffles Wall
Street - Trading Glitch Suspected in 'Mayhem' as Dow Falls Nearly 1,000, Then Bounces,
WALL ST. J., May 7, 2010, at Al. Early inquiries suggest that a liquidity crunch exacerbated
by program trading caused the wild swings. See SEC & COMMODITY FuTURES TRADING
COMM'N, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010 (2010).
178. Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 934 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) ("A
common way to manipulate the market in a security is to cause its price to increase by
creating the illusion of more investor interest than really exists."). Fischel and Ross describe
this effect as follows:
[T]he price of a security at any point in time depends on the value investors
expect it will provide in the future. That future value is uncertain. Investors who
obtain information that the future value is high relative to today's price will
want to buy. Their purchases, however, may lead other market participants to
revise upward their expectations about the value of the security and thus cause
[the] price to rise. Because the market price is a function of the information
available, trading may affect the market price by providing market participants
with additional information.
Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 515.
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relatively na'ive-a belief by retail investors that a price movement
reflects "momentum" for the stock. 179 Of course, would-be manipulators face problems in creating the intended price effect. First,
"[t]rading will affect prices only if the prospective manipulator can
convince others that his trading was informed," and "[t]rades in an
anonymous market are not likely to have this effect." 180 As a result,
many, if not most, block trades take place with no change in price
at all. 181 What is more, "the more informed [the manipulator] appears, the more likely prices will rise simultaneously with the
purchase and not thereafter." 182 Again, it is markets for inefficient
stocks that are more likely to be appreciably moved by manipulative
"information effects." Is a manipulator more likely to convince other
traders, purely through his trading activity, that he has uncovered
some new material information about Microsoft, or Odyssey? 183
179. See Harrison Hong & Jeremy C. Stein, Disagreement and the Stock Market, 21 J.
ECON. PERSP. 109, 120-22 (2007). These information effects are, of course, inconsistent with
extreme conceptions of perfect market efficiency. No real market, however, can be perfectly
efficient without destroying the mechanisms that generate efficiency in the first place. See
Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of lnformationally Efficient
Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 403-05 (1980). In any "real" market, decoding of the
information content of trading activity is one of the primary "mechanisms" for generating
efficiency. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 105, at 572-79. That said, empirical studies
do not support the idea that prices have "momentum," at least over time scales that are
relevant to retail investors. Nonetheless, some models of investor behavior and bubble
dynamics support the creation of feedback loops of momentum traders-investors believing
that a stock has momentum buy the stock, causing the price to go up and attracting even more
momentum investors. See Robert A. Jarrow, Market Manipulation, Bubbles, Corners, and
Short Squeezes, 27 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE .ANALYSIS 311, 311-12, 326, 332-33 (1992).
180. Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 517. A recent survey of SEC enforcement actions
found that manipulators are likely to be "'potentially informed parties' such as corporate
insiders, brokers, underwriters, large shareholders, and market makers." Aggarwal & Wu,
supra note 13, at 1917.
181. See Robert E. Holthausen, Richard W. Leftwich & David Mayers, The Effect of Large
Block Transactions on Security Prices: A Cross-Sectional Analysis, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 237, 24546 (1987).
182. Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 517. In addition, the would-be manipulator faces
the same problem of symmetry as we saw in our discussion of liquidity and price pressure
effects-"as the manipulator sells off his shares he depresses the price, which lessens his
profit." Desai, 573 F.3d at 934- Again, though, apart from !PO, none of the examples of
manipulation we have seen required the manipulator to unwind the manipulative trades to
profit. As the court in Desai said of the securities loan arrangement in that case, "this scheme
solved the classic problem of market manipulators everywhere: it allowed them to profit from
fraudulently inflating a stock's price without having to sell the shares." !d. at 935.
183. Remember that any overt fraudulent statements would be better analyzed as
misrepresentations. We are concerned here only with pure, trade-based manipulation.s.
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Consider the possibilities for Microsoft. The manipulator would need
to engage in trading that would be discernible among the tens of
millions of shares traded daily, and that would somehow convince
sophisticated price-decoders that the manipulator possesses new
material information about Microsoft-a company followed closely
by the financial press, hundreds of professional security analysts,
and countless deep-pocketed arbitrageurs. Alternatively, the manipulator would need, through the type of liquidity or price pressure
effects discussed in Part II.C.1, to create enough of a price movement to gull na'ive investors into discerning "momentum." As we
have seen, such price movement would be difficult or impossible to
create in any reasonably efficient market.
The chances of success would be much greater for an thinly
traded stock like Odyssey. First, it would be more plausible that the
manipulator could have new material information about a less
closely followed company. Furthermore, it would be easier to create
a noticeable spike in price, or at least in trading activity, that could
attract momentum investors and create a feedback loop.
This reasoning is supported by recent economic research. Indeed,
modeling of the kind of ''laddering" alleged in !PO requires a
downward-sloping demand curve for the relevant stock-a condition
that is inconsistent with an efficient market-in order for the manipulation to be successful. 184 Experience supports these theoretical
predictions. A recent survey of SEC enforcement actions alleging
market manipulation between 1990 and 2001 found "that most
manipulation cases happen in relatively inefficient markets, such
as the OTC Bulletin Board and the Pink Sheets, that are small and
illiquid." 185 In sum, whether the alleged manipulation is the kind of
direct liquidity or price pressure trading at issue in GAF, Milken,
184. See Ronen & Barath, supra note 132; Hao, supra note 132, at 102-22; Rajesh K.
Aggarwal, Arniyatosh K. Purnanandam & Guojun Wu, Underwriter Manipulations in Initial
Public Offerings (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=686252. Ronen and
Barath also conclude that "laddering is not a sustainable activity" unless there is a large
number of momentum traders and a lack of short-sellers or other arbitrageurs-again,
conditions inconsistent with market efficiency. Ronen & Barath, supra note 132, at 843. Even
under these assumptions,. the actual manipulative trading is not profitable: "Laddering
becomes feasible only in the sense that the profits made through the initial [IPO allocation]
at low issue prices outweigh the losses made in the aftermarket; it does not mean that prices
are inflated for any significant length of time." Id. at 844.
185. Aggarwal & Wu, supra note 13, at 1917.
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and Mulheren, the "information effect" trading at issue in Desai, or
the "laddering" at issue in IPO, the manipulations are far more
likely to have a material impact on prices in inefficient markets. 186
Despite this, it is the shareholders of Microsoft who would have an
easier time getting past the crucial class certification stage on a
well-pleaded claim of market manipulation. The unfortunate shareholders of Odyssey Marine Expeditions would struggle to gain class
certification for a well-pleaded claim of market manipulation, as
they would likely stumble on the required showing of an efficient
market.
Ill. THE "EFFICIENT MARKET" REQUIREMENT IN MANIPULATION
CLAIMS

Having established that market manipulation schemes are most
likely to succeed in thinly traded, inefficient markets and are likely
to fail in efficient markets, it is now possible to address the central
question of this Article: does it make sense to require lOb-5
plaintiffs alleging market manipulation to establish an efficient
market in order to gain the benefit of the FOTM presumption of
reliance? Does such a requirement follow from the principles
evidenced by the case law? The answer at this point should be clear:
no. The "efficient market" requirement manages to screen out the
cases where manipulation is most likely to occur and have an
appreciable impact. Indeed, the type of evidence that would tend to
show that a market manipulation scheme had a material effect on
the market for a security would be precisely the type of evidence
that would tend to show that the market was inefficient. At the
same time, the "efficient market" requirement does nothing to
prevent truly dubious claims of manipulation of blue-chip stocks
f~om getting past the crucial class certification stage, where they are
hkely to be settled. Furthermore, as we shall see, there is a paradox
at the heart of the concept that an investor can simultaneously rely
~: 6 · This is not to say that manipulation is never possible in more efficient markets. As the
d swagen and "flash crash" examples show, highly efficient stocks-or even broad market
In exes-can occasionally exhibit characteristics permitting successful manipulation. See
supra
· ·
be
s note. 177· I tIS
simply to say that a requirement that screens out inefficient stocks will
creemng out many-and probably most--<:ases of effective manipulation.

V
.
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upon prices set by an efficient market and a manipulative price
signal.
Although this position-that a showing of market efficiency is an
inappropriate "gatekeeping" requirement for class actions alleging
market manipulation-would mark a clear break with current
practice, it is actually a relatively modest proposition. One need not
reject either the FOTM doctrine or the relevance of the ECMH to
that doctrine in order to accept the conclusion here. Others have
called for far more extreme breaks with precedent-breaks that
would likely require new legislation or overruling of Supreme Court
precedent.
For example, some scholars and practitioners have called for
abandoning the FOTM presumption altogether, usually on the
practical grounds that it generates a potential for crushing liability
divorced from the merits, 187 but also on theoretical grounds. 188
Others have criticized courts' use of concepts of market efficiency at
all. 189 More to the point, several scholars have questioned whether
a stringent showing of market efficiency should be required for any
lOb-5 claims at all, without drawing any distinction between misrepresentation claims and market manipulation claims. 190 This
attack has been on both links of the chain of indirect causation.
First, scholars have noted that perfect efficiency-or even high
efficiency-is not required for a stock price to be distorted by a

187. See Alexander, supra note 100; Romano, supra note 100.
188. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 88, at 625 (arguing that "rejecting FOTM and requiring
individualized proof of reliance as a prerequisite to recovery under Rule 10b-5 would most
closely approximate optimal deterrence").
189. The principal thrust of these criticisms has tended to be that economists have, in light
of the rise of behavioral economics, "become less convinced that market efficiency works quite
so cleanly or powerfully'' as might have seemed likely when Basic was decided. Langevoort,
supra note 78, at 197. Similarly, the PSLRA also casts doubt on the extent to which courts
should inject notions of market efficiency into securities law. See Carden, supra note 97;
Oldham, supra note 43, at 1003; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and
Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 853-56 (1992)
[hereinafter Langevoort, Theories]; Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial
Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L.
REV. 1017, 1017-21, 1049 (1991); Robert G. Newkirk, Sufficient Efficiency: Fraud on the
Market in the Initial Public Offering Context, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1393, 1394-95 (1991).
190. See Langevoort, supra note 78; Langevoort, Theories, supra note 189, at 889-94, 90405; Jonathan R. Macey et al., supra note 189, at 1049.
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misrepresentation. 191 Second, they have argued that a high standard
for market efficiency is unnecessary to make reasonable an investor's reliance on the integrity of the market price. 192 This Article
takes no position on whether a showing of market efficiency should
be required in misrepresentation cases; indeed, this Article assumes
it should. Whether the arguments against the use of market efficiency are persuasive as applied to misrepresentation cases-and
the courts have not appeared to find them persuasive 193-the
market efficiency requirement is, at the very least, not inherently
illogical as applied in such cases. Perhaps it is true that even inefficient markets can be distorted in a measurable way by misrepresentations. But it is also true, as the First Circuit pointed out in its
recent In re PolyMedica Corp. Securities Litigation opinion, that
market efficiency creates greater confidence that the particular
misinformation alleged by the plaintiffs was, in fact, reflected in the
price, and reflected in a rapid and predictable fashion. 194
Similarly, even if it would be reasonable for a retail investor to
rely on the market price in a less-than-efficient market, presumably
191. Langevoort, for example, notes that "contemporary literature suggests that even for
widely traded stocks, substantial deviations from the efficiency ideal are quite possible."
Langevoort, supra note 78, at 175 (citing Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Market
Efficiency, Crashes, and Securities Litigation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 443, 450 (2006)). Indeed, the
price of a stock trading on relatively inefficient markets can also be distorted by public
misrepresentations. See, e.g., Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2005).
In Bell, the Fifth Circuit "affirmed a refusal to certify a Nasdaq-traded stock with some
twenty or so market makers and high trading volume in the context of a case where
immediately after a surprise disclosure of bad news, the stock price fell by some 30 percent."
Langevoort, supra note 78, at 173. Furthermore, as was discussed in Part II, commentators
and courts were invoking the FOTM presumption long before the ECMH made a home for
itself in the legal academy.
192. Langevoort argues that Basic "makes sense only if we see it as creating an entitlement
to rely on market-price integrity, even though there is no good reason for any investor simply
to assume the absence of fraud." Langevoort, supra note 78, at 178. From this proposition, he
reasons that the FOTM presumption "should permit recovery without a showing of actual
reliance ... so long as the market is sufficiently well organized that we have reason to believe
that fraud is likely to distort the price." Id. In this view, inefficiency should only bar the
presumption "where the institutional price-setting mechanism is so weak that reliance on
price integrity is manifestly unreasonable. It takes a high level of inefficiency for that to be
the case." Id.
193. One court did recognize the increasing academic skepticism of the ECMH, but decided
that any reexamination of Basic in light of this skepticism was a job for the Supreme Court.
Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 322 n.4 (5th Cir. 2005).
194. 432 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2005).
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it is more reasonable for them to rely on the market price in an
efficient market. Certainly it would not be less reasonable. 195 Thus,
the requirement of an efficient market is not actually counterproductive in misrepresentation cases. At the very least, the links in
the chain of indirect causation are strengthened by a showing of
market manipulation, not weakened.
Securities class actions are inherently complex, uncertain, and
expensive undertakings. It is only prudent to impose a gatekeeping
requirement limiting the universe of cases to those in which the
mechanism of injury is relatively clean and well-understood. The
market efficiency requirement-even if imperfect-is at least a
gesture in this direction in misrepresentation cases. It functions to
screen out cases in which the relationship between the alleged
misrepresentation and the price impact-if any-is likely to be muddled or attenuated, while preserving those in which the relationship
is likely to be more straightforward. 196 The same, however, cannot
be said about applying the market efficiency requirement in manipulation cases. As we have seen above, market manipulations are
most likely to have a relatively straightforward impact on prices in
inefficient markets and least likely to have an impact in efficient
markets. And yet, blind application of the efficient market requirement screens out those cases in which plaintiffs are most likely to
suffer injury from manipulation, while waving through those cases
in which plaintiffs are least likely to have suffered any injury. The
results of the market efficiency requirement are positively perverse
in manipulation cases-market efficiency actually severs one of the
links in the chain of indirect causation.
This incoherence extends to the question of whether an investor's
"reliance" on the market price was reasonable. As was discussed in
195. Even Langevoort-who argues that the presumption of reliance should be treated like
"a common law-like entitlement to rely on stock-price integrity, granted as a matter of juristic
grace"-appears to acknowledge that, as a practical matter, "[i]nvestors who buy or sell thinly
traded stocks should not be assuming much of anything." Langevoort, supra note 78, at 171,
198.
196. Macey, Miller, Mitchell, and Netter have pointed out that event studies-identifying
the impact, if any, of alleged misstatements-ean be done even for thinly traded stocks, but
the threshold for statistical significance will likely be far higher to reflect increased volatility.
Macey et al., supra note 189, at 1018. Viewed in this light, the courts' insistence upon market
efficiency can be seen as expressing skepticism regarding the applicability of event studies in
inefficient markets.
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Part I, scholars have occasionally questioned the analogy of securities fraud to common law fraud. 197 Market manipulation claims
are yet one more step removed from these common law origins than
are the misrepresentation cases on which courts and commentators
have focused. A market manipulator makes no statement or
omission that an investor could be said to "rely on" in a straightforward way at all. Indeed, to the extent that investors "rely" on a
manipulative price signal-that is, believe that it signals price
"momentum" or the presence of new information-they are registering their belief that the market is not even weak-form efficient. 198
Even indirect reliance is incoherent in this setting. In a misrepresentation case, if the market reacts to the misrepresentation, clearly
someone relied-a sufficient number of market participants to drive
the price. 199 But trading manipulation involving liquidity or price
pressure effects can have an effect on price even with nobody
"relying" on anything. In these situations, the only thing an investor
could be relying on is the integrity of the market price, which, in
turn, could be affected by manipulation without anyone directly
"relying" in the traditional sense. If "reasonable reliance" can mean
anything in such a context, it can only mean the kind of "common
law-like entitlement" favored by Langevoort as a "matter of juristic
grace." 200 Indeed, insofar as market manipulators do more than
simply seek to mislead investors-they actively seek to exploit the
mechanics of the market-some support for such an "entitlement"
in the manipulation setting can be gleaned from the Basic Court's

197. See supra note 52. Most obviously, Fischel argued that the common law concept of
reliance is altogether incoherent in the context of open market transactions and has no place
at all in 10b-5 actions. Fischel, supra note 56, at 11.
198. Recall that weak-form efficiency implies that prices fully reflect any information
contained in the past movement of the stock price itself, and thus that stock prices are an
example of a martingale. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. Thus, if an investor
believes a previous price increase means that future price increases are more likely, then the
investor does not believe the market is even weak-form efficient.
199. See supra note 16.
200. Langevoort, supra note 78, at 198. The question of whether relying on the market
price for a given security is actually reasonable in practice is distinct from the question of
whether the law should grant such an entitlement. We may chide a homeowner for foolishly
leaving his door unlocked in a high-crime area but still not deny him an action against the
burglar to recover his stolen property.
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invocation of the market's "integrity," and its oft-quoted question:
'Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?" 201
So what does this mean for market manipulation cases? Does it
mean that the FOTM presumption should not be applied at all in
such cases? No. But it does mean that the presumption must be
supported by different reasoning and, consequently, different
showings by the plaintiffs. If the FOTM presumption is to be
recognized in market manipulation cases, it must be for one of two
reasons. First, following Fischel, one could conclude that the
reliance requirement should be discarded entirely as an inapt
analogy from common law fraud. 202 If, however, one believes that
the Basic formulation provides a useful framework for misrepresentation claims, and should not be pulled up root and branch, a less
sweeping argument is required to distinguish market manipulation
claims.
The more limited possibility is the one advocated here-to
acknowledge that Basic's reasoning from market efficiency has some
force for misrepresentation claims, but to deny its applicability to
market manipulation claims. If a presumption of reliance is to be
given to plaintiffs bringing market manipulation claims, it must be
out of the sense of entitlement suggested by Langevoort. 203 It must
be simply because-as Fischel argues-investors do and rationally
should rely on prices in open market transactions, 204 and the law
should protect this reliance through a presumptive entitlement, just
as it protects other reasonable and desirable activities. 205 Such an
act of "juristic grace" 206 may not be necessary in misrepresentation
claims, in which the ECMH allows courts to construct a plausible
chain of indirect reliance, but it is essential for market manipulation claims. 207 Of course, if the interest being protected is only the
201. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246-47 (1988).
202. Fischel, supra note 56, at 11.
203. See supra note 192.
204. Fischel, supra note 56, at 3-5.
205. See RICHARD A POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 111 (7th ed. 2007). The
argument is that efficiency is enhanced by creating and enforcing a legal right to rely-on
factual representations or on lack of manipulation-rather than forcing the parties to
investigate the matter ahead of time. Id.
206. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
207. An alternative justification for requiring market efficiency in misrepresentation cases
would be that it is unreasonable for investors to assume an absence of public misinformation,
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right to rely on the integrity of market prices, this entitlement
should not, like Basic, create a double presumption of reasonable
reliance and loss causation. A presumption of loss causation can
only be justified by assuming that misrepresentations will be
reflected in prices through the operation of efficient markets. But
there is no direct analog to this causal mechanism in market
manipulation cases-as we have seen, market efficiency is likely to
actually sever the causal chain. Even in an inefficient market, there
is no comparable reason to assume market impact and loss causation. Thus, the only plausible presumption, as a matter of "juristic
grace," is of reasonable reliance. Making this presumption hinge on
a stringent standard of efficiency is unnecessary and incoherent.
In Part IV, we will see this incoherence play out-in extravagant,
extended, and expensive fashion-in two high-profile lawsuits. But
we need not await this demonstration to state our conclusion:
''When the rationale for a given legal rule is inapplicable, so too
must be the rule." 208 The rationales for requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate an efficient market are inapplicable in market manipulation cases. Thus, the requirement should be abandoned as incoherent and counterproductive. Even if the requirement plays a useful
and logical role in misrepresentation cases, it fails to do so in
manipulation cases. 209
IV. !PO AND DESAI-THE "EFFICIENT MARKET" REQillREMENT IN
ACTION

To fully appreciate the counterproductive nature of the "efficient
market" requirement in market manipulation cases, 210 it is helpful
to take a closer look at two recent, high-profile cases-JPO and
Desai. 211 Both cases ultimately foundered on the efficient market
but reasonable-as a matter of law-for investors to assume a lack of affirmative market
manipulation. See Fischel, supra note 56, at 3-4.
208. Nagareda, supra note 19, at 137.
209. This does not imply that having no gatekeeper requirement at all would be an
improvement over the market efficiency requirement. Potential "replacement" gatekeepers
are discussed in Part V.
210. See supra Part III.
211. Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); cases
cited supra note 25.
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requirement, but only after years oflitigation that never progressed
beyond the class certification stage. The outlines of the alleged
manipulative schemes were described in Part II. A more detailed
account of the ensuing litigation, however, demonstrates that the
efficient market requirement eventually did serve as a gatekeeper
-resulting in dismissal of both cases-but in a fashion almost
entirely unrelated to the merits of the underlying claims, and only
after years of expensive wrangling over class certification.
A. In re IPO Securities Litigation

In 2001, following the collapse of the dot-com tech stock boom of
the 1990s, thousands of individual actions were filed against the
issuers and underwriters for hundreds of IPOs during the bubble. 212
The plaintiffs' basic premise was that underwriters used various
illegal schemes to artificially inflate the price of stock for the
hundreds of new tech issuers in the immediate aftermarket of their
IPOs. 213 The initial allocants and insiders at the issuers were able
to unload the worthless stock at these inflated prices, kicking back
a portion of the profits to the underwriters through inflated fees and
other "undisclosed compensation."214 The plaintiffs alleged a mix of
what we have been calling "market manipulation" claims and
"misrepresentation" claims. As for market manipulation, the plaintiffs alleged that the underwriters "required their customers to
enter into agreements to buy additional shares of the Issuer in the
aftermarket as a condition of receiving the right to purchase the
IPO stock." 215 As part of these so-called "Tie-in Agreements," some
"customers were ... required to make those purchases at predetermined escalating prices" 216-a practice referred to as ''laddering." 217
Although the exact causal mechanisms were left fuzzy, these market
manipulations evidently are supposed to have inflated price through
a combination ofliquidity, price pressure, and information effects. 218
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

IPO I, 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id.
Id. at 293-94.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.

IPO L 241 F. Supp. 2d at 303-07. The plaintiffs also alleged a welter of misrep-
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1. Initial District Court Proceedings
The primary struggle in IPO was over class certification, an issue
that ballooned into a five-year war of experts centered on the issues
of market efficiency and loss causation. The plaintiffs sought a class
period for each stock ranging from the IPO date to December 6,
219
2000 -a period that stretched over eighteen months for at least
one stock-and sought to rely on the FOTM presumption of reliance.220 In an October 13, 2004, opinion, Judge Scheindlin granted
class certification. 221 On the basis of then-controlling precedents in
the Second Circuit, 222 Judge Scheindlin found that, in order to
certify a class in which the elements of Rule 23 are "enmeshed" with
the merits, plaintiffs needed only make "some showing" that those
elements were met. 223 As a result, Judge Scheindlin found that the
question of market efficiency was ultimately a faCtual issue "to be
resolved at trial." 224 Accordingly, upon noting that the focus stocks
(1) traded on the NASDAQ, (2) traded at relatively high volume, and
(3) were followed by analysts and the media, 225 Judge Scheindlin

resentations-in the registration statements and prospectuses themselves, and in analyst
reports and other public statements-in support of these supposed market manipulations.Id.
at 296. Claims for these misrepresentations were brought under sections 11 and 15 of the
1933 Act, and sections 10(b) and 20 of the 1934 Act. The potential damages stretched into the
hundreds of billions. Id. at 296-98.
219. On this date, the Wall Street Journal published a front-page story detailing many of
the alleged manipulative practices. See Susan Pulliam & Randall Smith, Seeking IPO Shares,
Investors Offer To Buy More in After-Market, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2000, at AI.
220. IPO II, 227 F.R.D. 65, 72, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006). In
addition to hundreds of pages of briefing and thousands of pages of exhibits and appendices,
the parties submitted a total of eleven expert reports supporting or opposing class
certification.Id. at 73-74.
221. Id. at 74, 122.
222. Primarily Caridad u. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999),
and In re Visa Check! MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2001), as they
interpreted Eisen u. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). IPO II, 227 F.R.D. at 92-93.
See also supra text accompanying note 95 (noting the tension in the precedent).
223. IPO II, 227 F.R.D. at 92-93.
224. Id. at 107.
225. Id. Judge Scheindlin mentioned that "[t]he Second Circuit has not adopted a test or
method for determining whether the market for a security is efficient," and listed the Cammer
factors as plausible indicia, but held out the possibility that less stringent standards for
market efficiency could also be appropriate. Id. at 107 & n.323.
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found the undemanding "some showing" standard met for the purposes of class certification. 226

2. Appeal to the Second Circuit-IPO III
On appeal, the Second Circuit considered two issues: (1) whether
the district court was correct to use the lenient "some showing"
standard at class certification; and (2) whether the Basic presumption could apply. 227 Before the Second Circuit, in addition to a
sweeping argument that the FOTM presumption should never apply
to market manipulation claims, 228 the defendants pointed out that,
under Basic, a presumption of reliance could not be afforded to the
plaintiffs because they had failed to demonstrate an efficient
market. 229 Furthermore, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs
had failed to establish that loss causation could be proved on a
common basis, thus also tacitly recognizing that a presumption of
loss causation is not warranted in market manipulation cases. 230 By
now, the muddle is painfully obvious. Both sides-defendants and
plaintiffs alike-are put in a Catch-22 situation by the combination
of Basic's seeming insistence on market efficiency and the seeming
226. ld. at 107-08. Interestingly, without explicitly noting that she was doing so, Judge
Scheindlin appears to have proceeded under the assumption that market efficiency did not
entitle the plaintiffs to a presumption of loss causation for market manipulation claims.
Instead, the district court analyzed loss causation separately, asking whether the plaintiffs
had "present[ed] a methodology for determining loss causation that may be commonly applied
to all members of the class." ld. at 111. Again, the district court proceeded under the lenient
"some showing" standard, declining to engage in a duel of the experts at class certification.
ld. at 93, 114-15. Accordingly, the district court found that the plaintiffs had "satisfied their
burden at this stage to articulate a theory of loss causation that is not fatally flawed." ld. at
115. The plaintiffs' proposed methodology was set forth in a trio of expert reports submitted
by Fischel. See id. at 112-14.
227. IPO Ill, 471 F.3d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 2006).
228. Reply Brieffor Defendant-Appellant Underwriters at 26, IPO III, 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir.
2006) (No. 05-3349-cv), 2005 WL 6068757 [hereinafter IPO III Def. Briefj. In arguing that
efficient markets are unlikely to be affected by manipulative trading, the defendants relied
heavily on West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935 (7th Cir. 2002), and on Fischel's
academic publications, including Fischel & Ross, supra note 102. IPO III Def. Brief, supra at
47-48,68.
229. IPO III Def. Brief, supra note 228, at 31-35. Among other things, the defendants
argued that post-IPO '"quiet' period[s]" during which analysts cannot report, the inability of
new issuers to file simplified Form S-3 statements, and the nature of the Internet "bubble"
all weighed against a fmding that the focus stocks traded in efficient markets. ld.
230. ld. at 32.
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incompatibility of efficiency and successful market manipulation. In
order to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs must allege that
the defendants' manipulative trading had a significant and lasting
impact on market price-a claim that is broadly inconsistent with
actual market efficiency. But in order to get a presumption of
reliance and gain class certification, the plaintiffs are then forced to
turn around and argue market efficiency. On the other side of the
coin, in order to combat class certification, the defendants are forced
to argue that the relevant markets are inefficient. To prevail on the
merits, however, they would have every reason to turn around and
argue that, in fact, the markets were too efficient for any manipulative trading to have an appreciable effect. 231
The muddle is easily resolved, however, when one separates the
justifications for the FOTM presumption in misrepresentation
claims from those for the FOTM presumption in market manipulation claims. The district court and the defendants appeared to
recognize-without saying so explicitly-that loss causation cannot
be presumed for market manipulation claims. The double presumption is off the table, and the only question at issue is reasonable
reliance. But as has been shown, the question of "relying" on a
manipulation is often incoherent-manipulations can have an
impact on price without anyone "relying" on anything. 232 The court
must either reject reliance as an element altogether or else must
treat reliance as an entitlement to rely on the integrity of the
market. If the court rejects reliance altogether, market efficiency is
necessarily irrelevant. If the court treats reasonable reliance as a
matter of entitlement, market efficiency is relevant only insofar as
we condition the entitlement on some minimum showing that the
relevant market was open and developed. In either case, the parties
would not need to tie themselves up in knots arguing simultaneously for and against market efficiency.
Alas, the Second Circuit did not see fit to clear up the muddle
and, in fact, did not appear to notice it. The bulk of the opinion is
231. Of course, this is not the only argument open to defendants. They could, for example,
deny efficiency at the class certification stage and then argue on the merits that the allegedly
manipulative trades were not motivated by manipulative intent. The point is simply that the
parties-plaintiff and defendant alike-will generally find it in their interests to argue one
way with respect to efficiency at class certification, and the other way on the merits.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 198-202.
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taken up with the procedural question of the proper standard for
determining whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met. The
court joined other circuits in rejecting the lenient "some showing"
standard, holding that a district court must make a firm determination-prior to certifying a class-that each of the Rule 23
requirements has been met, even ifthese requirements overlap with
the merits. 233
Because the applicability of the FOTM presumption will determine the predominance of common issues, this new standard
entailed rigorous scrutiny of market efficiency at the class certification stage. 234 Rather than remanding for reconsideration under the
proper standard, the Second Circuit considered the question itself.
Although the court suggested that it is "doubtful whether the Basic
presumption can be extended, beyond its original context, to tie-in
trading," 235 the court did not consider whether the market efficiency
requirement was appropriate in this different context, and instead
cited precedent involving misrepresentation claims. 236 The court
went on to find that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the presumption in any case, because "the market for IPO shares is not
efficient"-a finding based largely on the same factors cited by the
defendants. 237 The court went on to observe that "the [p]laintiffs'
own allegations as to how slow the market was to correct the alleged
price inflation despite what they also allege was widespread know-

233. See IPO III, 4 71 F.3d at 42; In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir.
2005); Unger v. Aroedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 2005); Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400
F.3d 562, 566-67, 575 (8th Cir. 2005); Gariety v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P., 368 F. 3d 356, 366
(4th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he factors spelled out in Rule 23 must be addressed through findings, even
if they overlap with issues on the merits."), affd, 261 F. App'x 456 (4th Cir. 2008); Newton v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 166-69 (3d Cir. 2001); Szabo v.
Bridgeport Mach., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[A] judge should make whatever
factual and legal inquiries are necessary under Rule 23 [even if] the judge must make a
preliminary inquiry into the merits.").
234. See, e.g., IPO III, 471 F.3d at 42-43.
235. Id. at 43.
236. In describing the FOTM doctrine, the IPO III court cited Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366
F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2004) ("The fraud-on-the-market doctrine, as described by the Supreme
Court in Basic [Inc.] v. Levinson, creates a rebuttable presumption that (1) misrepresentations
by an issuer affect the price of securities traded in the open market, and (2) investors rely on
the market price of securities as an accurate measure of their intrinsic value."). IPO III, 4 71
F.3d at 42.
237. IPO III, 471 F.3d at 42.
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ledge of the scheme indicate the very antithesis of an efficient
market." 238 This final observation of the !PO III court perfectly
encapsulates the impossible dilemma facing investors seeking to
bring market manipulation claims as class actions. Because of the
"efficient market" requirement, the more plausible the allegations
of manipulation, the less likely a class is to be certified in the first
place.

3. Back to the District Court
Following !PO III, the district court permitted the plaintiffs to
amend their allegations to avoid the most glaring defects pointed
out by the Second Circuit, and then rejected the defendants' motion
to dismiss the amended complaints. 239 At this point, the question
again became one of class certification.
For the first time, the plaintiffs attempted to draw a distinction
between the misrepresentation and market manipulation claims, 240
and argued that the FOTM presumption should function differently
for the different types of claims. 241 For the market manipulation
claims, the plaintiffs argued that if they could show that loss
causation was susceptible to classwide proof, 242 they should benefit
from a presumption of reliance if they could show "that the market

238. Id. at 43. The court also pointed out several other aspects of the claims that were
"bristling with individual questions." Id. at 44. Indeed, the IPO III court would have had
ample reason to decertify the classes even if the FOTM presumptions had applied.
239. IPO IV, 544 F. Supp. 2d 277, 281, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Somewhat implausibly, Judge
Scheindlin found that the Second Circuit's finding of market inefficiency applied only to the
primary market for IPO shares, the initial allocation, and not to secondary trading in the
aftermarket. Id. at 295. Incidentally, nearly a dozen more expert reports were generated in
the course of briefing the new motion to dismiss. If nothing else, the IPO case highlights what
a cash machine current doctrine can be for experts on market efficiency.
240. Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Motion for Class Certification at 38, IPO IV, 544 F. Supp.
2d 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 21 MC 92) [hereinafter IPO Pl. Brief].
241. Mter arguing that Basic provided for a double presumption of reliance and loss
causation, the plaintiffs acknowledged the need to show market efficiency to gain the FOTM
presumption for their misrepresentation claims. Id. at 36, 44-45.
242. Plaintiffs argued that they had "submitted expert reports explaining how Plaintiffs
intend to prove, on a classwide basis, that Defendants' manipulative conduct artificially
inflated stock prices." Id. at 38.
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appeared to be efficient to the average investor"-even if the
market's efficiency had been destroyed by manipulation. 243
Although the !PO plaintiffs were unable to offer much in the way
of support for this argument, it has some appeal when viewed in
light of the analysis in Part III. Because the picture of indirect
reliance-through the mechanism of efficient markets-does not
apply to market manipulations, plaintiffs should not benefit from a
presumption of loss causation. But if we are to keep reliance as a
requirement at all, it should be presumed, in keeping with the
purposes of the 1934 Act: "restoring investor[ J confidence in
financial markets" and "reducing transaction costs associated with
a caveat-investor rule." 244 As such, investors should be required to
show only that some basic indicia of efficiency were present in order
for reasonable reliance to be presumed. 245 For better or for worse,
this argument never got a hearing in court. After eight years of
litigation, never progressing past the class certification stage, the
parties reached a settlement for $586 million. 246

243. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that
in a manipulation case, where the plaintiffs expect to bear the burden of
establishing the existence of artificial inflation, so long as the plaintiffs can show
that the market appeared to be efficient to the average investor, they should also
be "presumed to rely reasonably on the integrity of the market price of a security
that is traded in such a market."
Id. (quoting Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 198 (6th Cir. 1990)). The
plaintiffs sought to bolster their argument by citing a recent Second Circuit opinion referring
to "reliance on an assumption of an efficient market free of manipulation" as an element of
a market manipulation claim. ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 101 (2d
Cir. 2007). It seems unlikely, however, that the ATSI panel intended to redefine application
of Basic in the manner suggested by the plaintiffs.
244. Futura Dev. Corp. v. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 1985); see also Basic Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988) ("[Congress] enacted legislation to facilitate an investor's
reliance on the integrity of [securities] markets.").
245. Unlike a showing of genuine market efficiency, this showing would not necessarily
contradict a claim of market manipulation, though it still could rule out class actions for
extremely thinly traded stocks, in which we might think manipulation would be most
common.
246. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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B. Desai v. Deutsche Bank Securities
Desai presents another seven-year odyssey in failed pursuit of
class certification. 247 This time, however, the plaintiffs began
arguing early on that the reliance requirement should work
differently in market manipulation claims, forcing the courts to
confront the issue. The results were dispiriting.
1. Minnesota District Court

Mter initially claiming that they were entitled to the FOTM
presumption of reliance under Basic, the plaintiffs "waffled in their
presentation of the theory of their case" upon realizing that market
efficiency would be inconsistent with the allegations of enormous
price swings due to manipulation. 248 The plaintiffs "concede[d] that
the market for Genesis stock was not 'efficient' as that term is used
in establishing a fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance,
and [that] a showing of efficiency is essential to the applicability of
this presumption."249 Instead-like the plaintiffs in !PO eventually
did-the plaintiffs in Desai claimed "that they 'relied upon the
integrity of the market, which had been secretly corrupted' by
Defendants." 250 Rather than treating reliance on the "integrity" of
the market as an entitlement or judicial presumption, the district
court proceeded to treat it as something that would have to be
established for each individual plaintiff. 251 As a result, the. court
found that individual issues would predominate, precluding class
certification. 252
24 7. The allegations regarding manipulation of Genesis stock were described in some detail
in Part II.B.5 and will not be repeated here. The procedural history is tangled. The suit itself
was initially flied in the Central District of California and transferred to the District of
Minnesota in 2003. Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d931, 935-36 (9th Cir. 2009)
{per curiam). Following denial of class certification, the case was transferred back to
California. ld. at 936.
248. In re Genesislntermedia, Inc. Sec. Litig., 232 F.R.D. 321, 332-33 (D. Minn. 2005).
249. ld.
250. ld. at 333.
251. I d. at 334 ("Plaintiffs have not provided the Court with any authority to establish that
reliance on the integrity of the market price, without a showing that the market was efficient,
may create a class-wide presumption of reliance.").
252. I d. ("Plaintiffs' allegations that each member of the class relied on the integrity of the
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2. California District Court
Class certification was considered again by the California district
court, by which time the plaintiffs presented a more developed
theory of reliance on the "integrity of the market." 253 At the hearing
on class certification, plaintiffs' counsel began by pointing out that
market manipulation claims are different in character from the
"traditional misrepresentation [or] omission case."254 Plaintiffs' went
on to argue that unlike in a misrepresentation case, in which false
information affects the market price through the workings of an
efficient market, in a market manipulation case, the "integrity of
the market is really what has been attacked." 255 In such a case,
plaintiffs should only be required to show reliance "upon the
integrity of the market"-namely, "that had they known that the
market do not, however, provide the Court with the mechanism by which to presume that
each class member did so.").
For good measure, the court also argued that because Desai himself was not a passive
investor-he testified that he bought the stock because it was "mispriced" due to investor
confusion over an announced stock split-then even the lead plaintiff did not actually rely on
the "integrity" of the market. !d. at 333. As Fischel pointed out back in 1982, it is "difficult to
know what to make" of this kind of argument, which "reflect[s] a conceptual confusion
concerning the market model of the investment decision." Fischel, supra note 56, at 11. "[A]n
investor could only decide that particular information"-like a stock split-"was relevant by
reference to the existing market price, ... when deciding whether to purchase/sell." !d. "By
definition, investors would have paid or received a different price" in the absence of
manipulation. !d. Thus, even an investor who believes a stock is mispriced relies on the
integrity of the market in making that judgment. This type of confusion resurfaces with a
vengeance in the California district court. See infra Part IV.B.2.
253. In addition to the novel "integrity of the market" theory, the plaintiffs also argued that
the Affiliated Ute presumption, for cases of material omissions, should apply, based on the
defendants' failure to disclose the manipulative scheme. In re Genesislntermedia, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 2007 WL 1953475, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Mfiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972)). The court rejected this argument, finding that the
"[p]laintiffs' complaint cannot be construed.as alleging 'primarily' claims of omissions." !d. at
*7.
254. !d. Plaintiffs' counsel said the following:
Ninety percent of the cases that have been before Your Honor, someone will
come in with a 10(K) or false financial and say, look right here on this piece of
paper, they lied about the condition of the company. That piece of information
is read by analysts, maybe read by individual investors, and permeates into the
market price. That is-if the market is efficient, that information is absorbed
and reflects itself in a higher price. That's a traditional misrepresentation [or]
omission case. That's not this case.
!d.
255. Id.
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[manipulation] was afoot ... they never would have purchased their
stock."256 Plaintiffs went on to note the Catch-22 nature of requiring
a showing of market efficiency: "you can't possibly require the
plaintiff to prove an efficient market when, by definition, his own
expert and the whole proof of the case is going to be that these guys
manipulated the market to destroy the very efficiency." 257 Finally,
the plaintiffs argued that market efficiency plays a causal role in
misrepresentation cases that it does not play in market manipulation cases. When a defendant has made a false statement, "there
has to be a showing that the market was efficient to absorb that
information," whereas in a manipulation case, "[t]here's nothing
that can be absorbed that's going to matter." 258 The California
district court rejected this argument on four grounds: (1) that courts
do not distinguish between misrepresentation and market manipulation claims for purposes of reliance; (2) that no courts have
adopted an "integrity of the market" theory; (3) that the theory "is
logically flawed because the inference of reliance is broken if the
market price of a security does not reflect the manipulative activity"; and (4) that the plaintiffs had also brought misrepresentation
claims. 259
This last ground is theoretically uninterestin~ 60 -the question is
whether an "integrity of the market" theory can ever apply to
market manipulation claims. The first two grounds merely restate
the same conclusion twice-one which is readily apparent at this
point: that courts, to date, have not thought through the salient
differences between misrepresentation and market manipulation
claims. The question was whether this court would be any different.
In the analysis supporting its third reason, the court answers with
a resounding "no."
In arguing that the plaintiffs' theory is "logically flawed," the
court rehearses the usual story of indirect reliance. But the court
reflexively extends this story to manipulations, stating that
"[r]eliance on the stock price is presumed to demonstrate indirect
256. ld.
257. ld. at *8.
258. ld.
259. ld.
260. A legitimate question exists, of course, as to how plaintiffs should be permitted to
establish reliance in cases involving both manipulation and overt misrepresentation.
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reliance on a misrepresentation or manipulation because an
efficient market reflects the misrepresentation or manipulation in
the price of the stock." 261 But, the court held, the plaintiffs conceded
that the market was not efficient.
Therefore, the Court cannot presume that the Genesis stock
price reflected any misrepresentations or manipulative conduct.
As a result, even if a plaintiff relied on the stock price when
purchasing Genesis securities, the Court cannot presume that
such reliance constitutes indirect reliance on a manipulation or
misrepresentation. In other words, a key link in the chain of
inferences supporting the presumption of reliance is broken
where the market is not efficient. Therefore, even if it is undisputed that the Plaintiffs relied on the integrity of the market
when they purchased Genesis stock, the Court has no means to
rationally infer that the Plaintiffs relied on the manipulations or
misrepresentations at issue. 262

Unfortunately, this reasoning has it completely backward. As is
shown in Part I.B.1, although it is perfectly true that market
efficiency strengthens the supposition that a misrepresentation will
be reflected in the price, market efficiency actually weakens any
supposition that manipulative trading will have an effect on price.
Of course, this makes the double presumption of Basic-reliance
AND loss causation-untenable in manipulation cases. Plaintiffs
will still need to show that the alleged manipulations actually
affected the market price. If anything, however, such a showing
would be made far less likely by the existence of a highly efficient
market. But if plaintiffs can establish an effect on prices, then "[b]y
definition, investors would have paid or received a different price
had there been no fraud on the market," 263 efficient market or not.

3. The Ninth Circuit Opinion
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit's majority opinion almost entirely
dodged the "integrity of the market" question. After giving a brief
261. Genesisintermedia, 2007 WL 1953475, at *13.
262. Id.
263. Fischel, supra note 56, at 11.
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summary of the plaintiffs' argument, the majority dismissed it in
three words: 'We are chary."264 After declaring their chariness, the
majority simply noted that "[n]o authority required the district court
to adopt [plaintiffs'] integrity of the market presumption," 265 and
that the Supreme Court had cautioned that "the § lO(b) private
right should not be extended beyond its present boundaries." 266 As
a result, the majority concluded that "the district court did not
abuse its discretion" in rejecting the "integrity of the market"
theory. 267 A concurrence by Judge O'Scannlain faulted the court for
passing the buck, noting that if the presumption put forth by the
plaintiffs is ''legally valid," its rejection is necessarily an abuse of
discretion. 268 Judge O'Scannlain then proceeded to "address the
integrity of the market presumption on the merits," ultimately
rejecting it. 269 First, Judge O'Scannlain reiterated that current case
law does not recognize such a theory. 270 He then went on to reject
the theory on the merits, arguing that it "would permit a presumption of reliance no matter how unlikely it is that the market price in
question would actually reflect the alleged manipulation." 271
The traditional requirement of an efficient market does not
address Judge O'Scannlain's concern, though, and in fact exacerbates it. As we have seen, market manipulations are most likely to
affect market prices in inefficient markets, and most unlikely to
affect market prices in efficient markets. Yet Judge O'Scannlain
would allow claims of manipulation in efficient markets an express
lane to class certification-and almost certain settlement-but block
claims of manipulation in inefficient markets.

264. Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
265. Id.
266. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165 (2008).
This quote is arguably pulled out of context. The issue in Stoneridge was whether a private
right of action exists for aiders and abettors-a new cause of action already rejected in Central
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). By
contrast, private actions for market manipulation have existed for decades.
267. Desai, 573 F.3d at 942.
268. Id. at 943 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (''We review class certification decisions for
abuse of discretion, but errors of law constitute per se abuses of discretion.").
269. Id.
270. Id. at 943-44.
271. Id. at 945.
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Judge O'Scannlain concluded the plaintiffs' theory "would prove
too much while doing too little." 272 Too much, ''because it would
obviate the need for plaintiffs in manipulative conduct cases to
prove reliance." 273 Too little, ''because it does not complete the causal
connection between a plaintiffs transaction in securities and a
defendant's manipulation." 274 Tellingly, these concerns are only
valid if Judge O'Scannlain is picturing the double presumption from
Basic. But, as the plaintiffs in IPO ultimately argued, a presumption of reliance on the integrity of the market does not necessarily
entail a presumption of loss causation. The plaintiffs can still be
required to show that the price during the class period was affected
by the manipulation. Of course, because Judge O'Scannlain is no
doubt aware that securities class actions overwhelmingly settle
upon certification of a class, it may be that he is really concerned
that, unless the plaintiffs are required to show loss causation at
class certification, they will never be required to show it at all. 275
At the end of his concurrence, Judge O'Scannlain appeared to
acknowledge the very problem discussed in this Article-that the
market-efficiency-based story of indirect reliance underlying the
double-presumption version of the FOTM theory might not really
apply to manipulation cases. In a footnote, he noted that "a plaintiff
must still show that the market in question could absorb into the
price the misinformation communicated by the alleged manipulation," but asked whether a plaintiff should be required to "show the
same type of proof of an efficient market in a manipulation case as
is required in a misrepresentation case." 276 Ultimately, however,
Judge O'Scannlain found that this question was not before the
court, as the plaintiffs "forsook the fraud on the market theory." 277

272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. This is a very real concern and is addressed in Part V.
276. Desai, 573 F.3d at 945-46 n.l.
277. Id. This statement is perhaps questionable. The plaintiffs could be said to have argued
for a different application of the FOTM theory to manipulation claims-just as Judge
O'Scannlain speculated was possible.
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V. OUT OF THE MUDDLE: A ''LOSS CAUSATION" REQUIREMENT
As Desai and !PO demonstrate, courts are likely to see increasing
numbers of plaintiffs seeking to avoid the Catch-22 of the efficient
market requirement-requiring both a showing of manipulation and
a showing that a manipulation could not have succeeded-by urging
a reconception of the FOTM doctrine in market manipulation
cases. 278 The arguments they make are likely to resemble those
made in the dying stages of Desai and JPO-that plaintiffs making
market manipulation claims should be granted a presumption that
they reasonably relied on the "integrity" of the market. In dealing
with these arguments, courts will eventually have to do better than
"we are chary." 279
The best solution would be to replace the requirement that
plaintiffs demonstrate market efficiency with a requirement that
they demonstrate market impact-that is, loss causation. It is the
loss causation link in the chain of indirect reliance that is missing
in manipulation cases; plaintiffs should be required to supply it to
gain class certification.
Courts have other options, but none are as appealing. First, they
could-like the Desai majority-reject such arguments wholesale in
favor of the status quo requirement of an efficient market for all
lOb-5 claims. As should be clear at this point, the status quo is
untenable. 280 Unlike misrepresentations, it is not a matter of
"common sense and probability" 281 that trading manipulations will
affect the price of stocks traded in efficient markets. Instead, the
efficient market requirement filters out plausible claims, while
posing little obstacle to class certification for implausible claims. In
performing this topsy-turvy filtering, the "efficient market" requirement is not even "efficient" with respect to litigation costs.

278. See, for example, In re Citigroup Auction Rate Securities Litigation, 700 F. Supp. 2d
294, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), in which plaintiffs alleging market manipulation explicitly
acknowledged lack of market efficiency and sought to rely "upon the integrity of the market"
for the defendant's shares.
279. Desai, 573 F.3d at 942 (per curiam).
280. See supra Part IV.
281. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988).
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Alternatively, the courts could embrace the Desai plaintiffs'
"integrity of the market" theory with open arms, allowing a
presumption of reliance without any showing at all. 282 From a
strictly theoretical point of view, this approach may make the most
sense. 283 Despite its theoretical appeal, however, powerful practical
282. Desai, 573 F.3d at 942.
283. Recall that Fischel originally argued that, even for misrepresentations, "[t]he logic of
the fraud on the market theory dictates that the reliance requirement as conventionally
interpreted be discarded altogether." Fischel, supra note 56, at 11. This is especially so in
market manipulation cases, in which even Basic's story of indirect reliance is
incoherent-when the manipulation distorts prices directly through liquidity and demand
pressures, nobody can be said to have "relied" on false information at all in the conventional
sense. See supra text accompanying notes 198-202.
Likewise, Judge O'ScaD..nlain's concern-that such a rule "would permit a presumption of
reliance no matter how unlikely it is that the market price in question would actually reflect
the alleged manipulation''-may be technically accurate, but theoretically misplaced in the
context of the class certification decision. Desai, 573 F.3d at 945 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
After all, in order to ultimately prevail at trial, plaintiffs would eventually have to show that
prices were actually affected. But at class certification, the relevant question is not whether
loss causation-and thus, indirectly, reliance--can be established. The relevant question is
whether, if loss causation-and thus, indirectly, reliance--can in the end be established, it
will be through common proof. Where the loss is allegedly caused by changes in market prices,
loss causation can almost always be established through common proof.
Furthermore, the theoretical concern about the FOTM presumption raised by Mahoney is
less pressing in the market manipulation context. Briefly, Mahoney argues that the purpose
of a reliance requirement is to minimize the social costs of fraud, which are primarily
precaution costs-society believes it is cheaper to protect investors against misrepresentations
ex post by first requiring them to rely and then allowing them to recover via securities fraud
claims, rather than requiring them to protect themselves against misrepresentations ex ante
by independent investigation of the relevant information. See Mahoney, supra note 88, at 63839. Although Fischel appeared to assume that the primary effect of a presumption of reliance
would be to induce "informed" traders to become "uninformed," Fischel, supra note 56, at 13,
-thus saving unnecessary "precaution costs"-Mahoney argues that the primary effect would
be to cause informed traders to engage in independent investigation, rather than to rely.
Mahoney, supra note 88, at 640. After all, those who do not rely will be better off in the
absence of a reliance requirement, although those who do rely will be worse off-they will
have to share any 10b-5 recovery with those who did not rely. Thus, a presumption of reliance
"does not reduce precautions-it reduces reliance, which is just the opposite of the purpose
of fraud law." Id.
This objection has far less force in the context of market manipulation claims. In
manipulations carried out primarily through liquidity and demand effects, nobody has to
"rely" on anything. In manipulations carried out primarily through information effects-in
which the major effect on prices is achieved through other investors' credulous "price
decoding'' of the manipulative trades, the analysis is more complex. See supra notes 183-85
and accompanying text. The false "information"-a misleading price/volume "signal"-is, as
a practical matter, instantly and costlessly available to investors. But this information cannot
simply be "relied on" like a statement in a quarterly report. It must be interpreted by price
decoding-a potentially costly and difficult undertaking. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note
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considerations weigh against such a !3ourse. First of all, eliminating
the reliance element altogether-in deed, if not in word-would
represent a clear break with an explicit holding of Basic. 284 Second,
it would remove entirely any gatekeeper to class certification when
"[w]ith vanishingly rare exception, class certification sets the
litigation on a path toward resolution by way of settlement, not fullfledged testing of the plaintiffs' case by trial." 285
Some may argue that the gatekeeper problem is less pressing in
the wake of the Supreme Court's recent holding in Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly. 286 In Twombly, the Court "retired" the old pleading
standard-that a complaint may only be dismissed if it appears the
plaintiff can prove "no set of facts" entitling her to relief-in favor
of more stringent '"plausibility pleading,' in which the plaintiff is
required to plead facts sufficient to suggest that the claim for relief
is 'plausible."' 287 Even under the new "plausibility" standard, however, courts are required to accept the pleaded facts as true for the
purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 288 Thus, although
Twombly requires that the facts as pleaded present a plausible
claim for relief-a standard that should not present serious
difficulty to skilled plaintiffs' lawyers-it does nothing to allow
courts to consider the plausibility of the alleged facts themselves
until after class action, when it is too late. 289 In practice, then, Judge
105, at 572-79.
If an investor "relies" on the price/volume signal-that is, assumes without investigation
that the signal is not a manipulation-the investor may waste resources fruitlessly
attempting to decode it. If the investor does not rely-that is investigates to determine
whether the signal is a possible manipulation-he may realize the signal contains no real
information, and not bother expending resources decoding it. Thus, the absence of a "reliance"
requirement in manipulation cases may increase "precaution costs," but decrease the
resources wasted on price decoding.
284. Basic, 485 U.S. at 243 ("[R]eliance is an element of a Rule lOb-5 cause of action.").
285. Nagareda, supra note 19, at 99. In practice, then, Judge O'Scannlain's concern, see
supra text accompanying note 271, is well placed.
286. 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
287. Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex Litigation in the
Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1997, 1997, 2000, 2012 (2010). More
recently, the Court has affirmed that this "plausibility" standard applies to all aspects of a
complaint subject to Rule 8(a). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-53 (2009).
288. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
289. Similarly, the pleading particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) and the
PSLRA-although certainly increasing the legal skill necessary to bring a complaint that will
survive a motion to dismiss--do little to provide courts with the ability to reject factually
implausible claims prior to class certification.
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O'Scannlain's concern is well-placed. 290 The pure "integrity of the
market" presumption put forward by the Desai plaintiffs would
allow manipulation plaintiffs a free pass to class certification and
settlement, without any assurance that the alleged manipulations
actually affected prices. 291
The better solution is to allow plaintiffs-as a matter of juristic
grace-an irrebuttable presumption that they relied on the "integrity" of the market, but require them to connect that reliance to the
manipulation by demonstrating market impact at the class certification stage. This solution is tailored to the fact that, unlike in the
case of a material misrepresentation, the ECMH cannot serve to
establish-as a matter of "common sense and probability"292 -that
market manipulations will affect stock prices. A showing of market
impact, therefore, supplies the missing causal link between reliance
and the manipulation. A requirement that this showing take place
at the class certification stage also serves as a logical gatekeeper
that actually pertains to the merits-blocking claims in which
plaintiffs are unable to establish a link between the alleged
manipulations and changes in prices, while allowing meritorious
suits to progress beyond class certification to almost certain
settlement. This is in contrast to the current gatekeeper-a showing
of market efficiency-which screens out the most likely candidates
for market manipulation but poses no obstacle to dubious claims. 293
Thus, the plaintiffs in IPO and Desai should have been required, in
order to achieve class certification, to make a showing-supported
by expert testimony-that the alleged manipulations did, in fact,
affect prices in a manner that would harm the plaintiff class. 294
290. Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 943 (9th Cir. 2009) (O'Scannlain, J.,
concurring).
291. By contrast, the traditional FOTM doctrine-coupled with the requirement of an
efficient market-does provide at least some assurance of market impact in misrepresentation
cases. To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must allege material misrepresentations. To
gain class certification, they must demonstrate an efficient market. In an efficient market, of
course, any material misinformation would be reflected in prices.
292. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988).
293. A requirement that plaintiffs show loss causation also goes far toward Fischel's
original view that the only relevant question in 10b-5 claims is "whether the alleged
[misconduct] ... caused the security to trade at an artificially high or low price." Fischel, supra
note 56, at 7.
294. In the typical FOTM misrepresentation case, the plaintiff usually demonstrates loss
causation by showing an abnormal movement in the relevant stock price, relative to a broader
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The key question, of course, is whether such a showing of loss
causation is appropriate at the class certification stage. Interestingly, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit in Oscar Private Equity
Investment v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., recently announced a requirement that plaintiffs in alllOb-5 suits-misrepresentation and
manipulation alike-demonstrate loss causation at class certification in order to benefit from the FOTM presumption. 295 Commentary
on the Oscar majority's reasoning has been skeptical, 296 and courts
outside the Fifth Circuit have not been receptive to the holding. 297
Nonetheless, it is valuable to consider whether the majority's
reasoning applies in manipulation cases, and whether the criticisms
lose their force in this context.
The Oscar majority notes that the "requirement [of a showing of
loss causation] was not plucked from the air," 298 but rather was
based on Basic's statement "that the presumption of reliance may
be rebutted by '[a]ny showing that severs the link between the
alleged misrepresentation and ... the price received (or paid) by the
plaintiff."' 299 Through an extremely lenient "any showing" standard
of rebuttal, the Fifth Circuit has, as a practical matter, "required
plaintiffs invoking the fraud on the market theory to demonstrate
loss causation."300
According to the majority, a showing of actual loss causation is
required-as opposed to a generalized showing at class certification
that loss causation can be established through common proofbecause actual loss causation is necessary to provide a causal
connection between the plaintiffs' reliance and the defendants'
misrepresentation. 301 A mere showing of"market efficiency" does not
market index, that can be linked to the misrepresentation or subsequent disclosure. For
market manipulation cases, the showing would be similar-an abnormal movement that can
be linked to the alleged manipulative trades. For the most inefficient penny stocks, such a
showing may be difficult, due to high volatility and lack of a stable "baseline" for the stock.
Of course, this difficulty would have to be overcome in order to prevail on the merits-the only
difference here is that the difficulty would have to be overcome to achieve class certification.
295. 487 F.3d 261,269 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Greenbergv. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d
657, 665 (5th Cir. 2004).
296. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 78, at 184-89.
297. See, e.g., Lapin v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 254 F.R.D. 168, 185-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
298. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 265.
299. Id. (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988)).
300. Id.
301. I d. at 269 (noting that a more generalized showing "might" be appropriate "if loss
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necessarily establish this causal link because the market could be
"demonstrated efficient by the usual indicia," but still be "actually
inefficient with respect to the particular type of information
conveyed by the material misrepresentation." 302 In sum, the Oscar
majority was skeptical of the first prong of Basic's double presumption-that material misrepresentations will necessarily be reflected
in prices in efficient markets. 303
In addition to providing the necessary causal connection between
reliance and the misrepresentation, the majority believed the loss
causation showing must occur at class certification because, in
modern litigation, class certification is the "signal event of the case,"
conferring "in terrorem power" on the plaintiffs and allowing them
to force settlement. 304 The court noted that the 2003 amendments to
Rule 23 strongly suggest that such decisions should be made in a
rigorous fashion prior to class certification, even if the issues
overlap with the merits. 305 What is more, the majority argued, a
showing ofloss causation should not require extensive discovery, as
the evidence will usually be "drawn from public data and public
filings," and the court's findings will be ''largely an empirical
judgment that can be made [at class certification] as well as later in
the litigation." 306 The majority's arguments in favor of a thoroughgoing showing ofloss causation at class certification, then, take three
forms. First, loss causation is necessary to establish a causal
connection between reliance on the market price and the misrepresentation, and market efficiency does not necessarily imply loss

causation were only empirical proof of materiality, unmoored from the question of classwide
reliance" but explaining "that the refutation of loss causation more appropriately relates to
the element of reliance") (internal quotations omitted).
302. ld. Alternatively, the misrepresentation would also not be reflected in the price if the
market is actually strong-form efficient. ld. ("A second possible explanation for a
misrepresentation's failure to move the market is that the market was strong-form efficient
with respect to that type of information, i.e., due to insider trading, the [true information] was
reflected by the stock price well before the ... corrective disclosure."). For a general discussion
of strong-form efficiency, see supra note 65.
303. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 264-65.
304. ld. at 266-67.
305. ld. at 267 ("These subtle changes [to Rule 23], as well as the less-subtle PSLRA,
recognize that a district court's certification order often bestows upon plaintiffs extraordinary
leverage, and its bite should dictate the process that precedes it.").
306. ld.
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causation. 307 Second, the class certification decision is the "signal
event" in securities litigation. 308 Third, establishing loss causation
should not require significant discovery. 309
Of these, the first gains significantly in strength when applied to
market manipulation cases, and the second remains the same, while
the third loses some force. First, loss causation is positively required
to establish a causal connection between reliance on the "integrity"
of the market and the manipulation itself-market efficiency serves
to sever such a connection, not create one. Second, class certification
remains the "signal event" of the litigation, and the implications of
Rule 23 and the PSLRA remain the same. Third, however, it is less
likely a full empirical inquiry into loss causation can take place
without at least some discovery as to the defendants' trading
activities. Nonetheless, because the issue will be primarily empirical
-did the defendants' trading materially affect market price?-the
discovery can be fairly limited in scope and need not extend to
knottier issues of scienter.
The primary criticisms of the Oscar majority's reasoning are far
less trenchant in the market manipulation context. The dissent by
Judge Dennis in Oscar gives a good account of these objections. 310
The first objection is simply that requiring a showing of loss
causation is inconsistent with Basic. 311 Basic adopted a presumption
that material misrepresentations are reflected in the stock price, 312
and Judge Dennis claims Oscar, together with an earlier decision,.
"improperly shifts the Basic burden, changing it from a defendant's
right of rebuttal to a plaintiff's burden ofproo£."313 The result is that
plaintiffs are "requir[ed] ... to prove, as a precondition to the application of the presumption, the very facts that are to be presumed
under Basic." 314
As we have discussed, the Basic Court was dealing with a misrepresentation case, and its rationales were fitted to such a context.
The Court's key presumption-that false statements and material
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

265.
266.
267.
272 (Dennis, J., dissenting).

Jd.

Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988).
Oscar, 487 F.3d at 274.
Jd.

1178

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1111

omissions will inflate or depress a stock's price 315-simply does not
apply, on its face, to trade-based manipulations. Requiring a
showing of loss causation in market manipulation cases does not
ignore or conflict with Basic's holdings, it merely adapts them to a
different context. Indeed, this is one of the great attractions of the
solutions proposed here-they require no legislative or even
Supreme Court action to implement. Abandoning the requirement
of a showing of market efficiency in favor of a showing of loss
causation is perfectly consistent with the underlying statutory
scheme, as well as the policies expressed in Rule 23 and the PSLRA.
Nor would taking these steps require action by the Supreme
Court-the Court has never confronted the issue of how the FOTM
doctrine should be applied to market manipulation claims, and the
proposals here are consistent with the reasoning of Basic. Circuit
courts, and even most district courts, could begin applying these
solutions immediately.
Similarly, one may agree with Judge Dennis that actual loss
causation-as opposed to a showing that loss causation can be
established through common proof-is not necessary to find the
requirements of Rule 23 met in misrepresentation cases, 316 yet not
be as troubled by this in misrepresentation cases. Langevoort, for
example, heavily criticizes the Oscar majority, yet has argued in the
past that courts should focus on "whether the market as a whole
was fooled"-that is, whether misrepresentations have actually
affected the price. 317 In a recent paper, Langevoort argued in
addition that such an inquiry-akin to the loss causation showing
advocated here-needed "to be an early-stage determination," made
prior to class certification. 318 In part, Langevoort is made comfortable with such an early-stage inquiry into loss causation because he
believes that, rather than stemming from theories of market
efficiency, "[t]he presumption of reliance is best thought of as an act
of juristic grace, in the name of both fairness and efficiency. We
need not follow it slavishly if there are doubts about either, much
less both." 319 As is argued earlier in this Article, a presumption of
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

See Basic, 485 U.S. at 244-45.
Oscar, 487 F.3d at 278.
Langevoort, Theories, supra note 189, at 904.
Langevoort, supra note 78, at 196.
Id. at 195.
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reliance on the "integrity'' of the market in manipulation cases must
be thought of as an act of "juristic grace." 320 Such grace should not
be bestowed unless there is some reason to believe it justified by
"fairness and efficiency."321 Furthermore, requiring plaintiffs to
establish loss causation at class certification is more appropriate,
and more consistent with precedent, for manipulation cases than for
misrepresentation cases. Thus, one may believe such a requirement
inappropriate for misrepresentation cases and still find it appropriate for manipulation cases.
The only remaining question is whether there should be any role
at all for market efficiency in manipulation cases. That is, should
plaintiffs need to establish that the relevant market was in some
limited sense "open and developed" in order to benefit from our
normative presumption of reasonable reliance? Probably so, but not
much turns on the answer, because the showing should necessarily
not be particularly demanding. Mter all, if it were too demanding
we would be right back where we started-weeding out plausible
claims of manipulation while allowing implausible claims a free
pass. At most, plaintiffs should simply be required to make a
cursory showing that the market possessed some of the general
indicia of efficiency embodied in the Cammer factors. 322 The purpose
of such a showing is twofold. First, it would preserve some sense of
reasonableness in the idea of "reasonable" reliance. Mter all, "[w]e
want investors to act with some diligence, and blind reliance should
not be rewarded. Investors who buy or sell thinly traded stocks
should not be assuming much of anything." 323 Second, reliance on
the integrity of patently inefficient markets arguably constitutes
recklessness, which normally bars recovery under lOb-5. 324
320. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
321. Others have made similar arguments in favor of requiring a showing of loss causation
at class certification for all10b-5 claims. See Oldham, supra note 43, at 1003. More generally,
Judge Posner has suggested that it would be desirable for judges to "make a preliminary
examination of the merits of the suit and to refuse to certify it as a class action unless
satisfied that the suit has a reasonable chance of succeeding on the merits." RICHARD A
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHAlLENGE AND REFORM 344 (1996).
322. See supra note 92. Of course, even this undemanding showing may rule out otherwise
meritorious class actions in some small penny stocks like the one mentioned in the
Introduction. It may be that such cases are best dealt with through individual litigation and
SEC enforcement actions.
323. Langevoort, supra note 78, at 171.
324. See Margaret V. Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule 1Ob-5: Should
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CONCLUSION

The traditional requirement for gaining the benefit of the FOTM
presumption of reliance-a showing of market efficiency-should be
abandoned in market manipulation cases. The rationales for the
market efficiency requirement, although defensible in the context
of misrepresentation claims, are inapplicable to manipulation
claims. Market efficiency simply does nothing to suggest a causal
connection between reliance on the market price and manipulative
conduct. Indeed, market efficiency tends to sever this connection,
and the requirement of market efficiency leads to perverse results
in actual litigation.
Instead, plaintiffs alleging market manipulation should be
presumed to rely on the integrity of even minimally efficient
markets, but be required to establish loss causation at the class
certification stage in order to link this reliance to the alleged
manipulation. Such a requirement would serve as a logical and
effective gatekeeper to class certification without doing violence to
Supreme Court precedent.

Careless Plaintiffs Be Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 96, 113 (1985).

